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Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:
An Argument Against Neutrality
Kim Yuracko

Abstract

Title VII prohibits discrimination whereby women or men are denied employment
opportunities because of their status as such. Much of the employment discrimination taking place today, however, targets not all women or men, but only those
with particular traits or characteristics - for example, women who are aggressive
or men who are effeminate. This article addresses the question of when, if ever,
trait discrimination is actionable sex discrimination under Title VII. The dominant
response advocated by scholars has been to require employers to act in a rigid and
formalistically sex-neutral manner toward their employees. If an employer allows
female employees to wear dresses, the employer must allow male employees to
wear dresses as well. To do otherwise is actionable sex discrimination. This paper
suggests a new response to trait discrimination that returns to Title VII’s original
focus on ending status-based hierarchy. The power/access approach advocated in
this paper treats trait discrimination as actionable sex discrimination only when
it stems from gender norms and scripts that are themselves incompatible with
sex equality in the workplace. The paper contends, in contrast to most current
argument, that rigid sex neutrality is neither required by Title VII nor socially
desirable.

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION:
AN ARGUMENT AGAINST NEUTRALITY
Kimberly A. Yuracko*

Before the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
many jobs in America were formally sex-segregated.1
Employers openly and unabashedly excluded women from
desirable high paying jobs reserved for men.2 The story of
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor being unable to find a law firm
job other than as a legal secretary after graduating at the top
of her class from Stanford Law School in 1952 is now well-
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1 See SHARON WHITNEY, THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: THE HISTORY
AND THE MOVEMENT 20 (1984); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER:
SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 58 (1989).
2 Diane Bridge describes, for example, a Westinghouse manual from the
early 1900’s which provided that: “the lowest paid male job was not [to]
[sic] be paid a wage below that of the highest paid female job, regardless
of the job content and value to the firm.”
She also quotes the
International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union contract from 1913 which
limited women to the less skilled jobs and provided that “the highest
paid female could not earn more than the lowest paid male.” See Diane
L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical and Legal
Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581 (1997).
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known and almost quaintly anachronistic.3 Her experience,
however, was typical of the time.4
Indeed, private discrimination was in some cases
required by state law.
“By the mid-1960’s 26 states
prohibited women from working in certain jobs and 19 states
had hours regulations for women workers.”5 Women were
statutorily excluded from jobs that required heavy lifting6 as
well as from work as diverse as tending bar,7 shining shoes,
and legislative service.8 Society viewed men as primary
labor market participants and primary wage earners.
Society viewed women as peripheral market participants
and supplemental wage earners seeking “pin money.”9
See Women’s History Month Biography, Sandra Day O’Connor at
http://www.gale.com/free_resources/whm/bio/oconnor_s.htm;
see
also Mary Jo White, Remarks: The 2002 Sandra Day O’Connor Medal of
Honor Recipient, 26 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE J. 263, 266 (2002).
4 See Barbara Allen Babcock, Forward: A Real Revolution, 49 U. KANSAS L.
REV. 719, 721 (2001) (describing the “open and rank discrimination”
faced by female lawyers when she graduated from Yale Law School in
1963). See also RHODE, supra note __ at 55 (noting that “[a]n extensive
survey of law school graduates and administrators in the mid-1960’s
reported almost two thousand separate occasions on which employers
had disclosed policies against hiring women”).
5
KAREN J. MASCHKE, LITIGATION, COURTS AND WOMEN WORKERS 5
(1989).
6 See Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive, 416 F.2d 711, 717-18 (7th Cir. 1969)
(referring to state laws excluding women from jobs which require lifting
heavy weights); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co. 293 F. Supp. 1219 (C.D. Cal.
1968) (ruling on a post Title VII challenge to California’s “hours and
weights legislation” which barred women from jobs involving lifting of
certain weights).
7 See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute
prohibiting women from tending bar unless they were the wives or
daughters of male owners).
8
RHODE, supra note __ at 44 (explaining that “[d]uring the late
nineteenth century, legislatures began passing an increasing volume of
exclusionary laws, and by mid-twentieth century, women in half the
states were banned from work ranging from shining shoes to legislative
service”).
9 See WHITNEY, supra note __ at 14 (noting that in the Great Depression
“the myth that most women were working simply to earn ‘pin money’
3
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It was in this social climate that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed. Much has been made of the
fact that “sex” was introduced into the Civil Rights Act one
day before its passage in the House by a Southern
representative who was strongly opposed to the Act.10
Indeed, it is often said that the amendment to include sex as
a protected category was proposed as a last ditch attempt to
kill the Act.11 While this may have been the motive of some
of the amendment’s sponsors, the push to include sex in the
Civil Rights Act was not some spontaneous joke. It was in
many ways the culmination of 40 years worth of attempts to
pass a Constitutional amendment guaranteeing women
equal rights.12 Statements made on the floor of the House by
supporters of the sex discrimination amendment make clear
that they intended the prohibition to end the blanket
for luxuries took over. Only men were recognized as legitimate
breadwinners, and twenty-six state legislatures passed laws forbidding
employers to hire married women”).
10
The amendment to include sex in the Act was introduced by
Representative Howard Smith, a conservative representative from
Virginia who opposed the Civil Rights Act. Although Smith opposed
the Civil Rights Act he had been a prior sponsor of the Equal Rights
Amendment for women. See Bridge, supra note __ at 610; RHODE, supra
note __ at 57. See also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th
Cir. 1982); Note, Sex Discrimination, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1166, 1167 (1971).
11 See WHITNEY, supra note __ at 19 (opining that “[i]n an effort to defeat
[Title VII] . . ., a group of conservative southern representatives added
the word ‘sex’ to the list [of prohibited characteristics]. They figured if
women’s rights were coupled with black civil rights, the bill would be
such a joke it would fail”).
12 As Katherine Franke has noted, there was a record of congressional
thinking about the employment rights of women stemming from
Congress’ consideration of prior sex equality legislation beginning with
the introduction of the first Equal Rights Amendment Act in Congress in
1923. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination
Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14-24
(1995). See also UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] 3224 (testimony of
Representative May that an equal rights for women amendment had
been proposed in the House since 1923).
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exclusion of women from jobs and to dismantle the sexbased hierarchy of the work world that such exclusion
maintained.13
Title VII has been extremely effective at ending
formal sex segregation.14 Discrimination rarely these days
Representative Griffiths argued that without including protections for
sex in the Act women would continue to populate lower paid jobs and be
excluded from better jobs reserved for men. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note __ at 3210. Moreover she argued that the prohibition of sex
discrimination was needed to eradicate states’ protective legislation that
only served to entrench women’s subordinate employment position.
Griffith’s argued that “some protective legislation was to safeguard the
health of women. But it should have safeguarded the health of men, also.
Most of the so-called protective legislation has really been to protect
men’s rights in better paying jobs.” Id. at 3219. Similarly, Representative
St. George argued in favor of the amendment as a way to challenge
restrictive protective labor laws that prevented “women from going into
the higher salary brackets.” Id. at 3221. St George explained: “Women
are protected—they cannot run an elevator late at night and that is when
the pay is higher. They cannot serve in restaurants and cabarets at
night—when the tips are higher—and the load . . . is lighter.” Id. at 3221.
See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 160 (1976) (Brennan, J.
dissenting) (arguing that the primary purpose of Title VII was “to assure
equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially[or
sexually] stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority [or
female] citizens”); Int’l Bd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
364 (1977) (noting that “a primary objective of Title VII is . . . to achieve
equal employment opportunities and to remove the barriers that have
operated to favor white male employees over other employees”); Franks
v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 767 (1976) (explaining that the goal
of Title VII was to “prohibit all practices in whatever form which create
inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin”).
14 See e.g., Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228
(5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the employer’s policy of refusing to hire
women for “switchman” positions violated Title VII); Diaz v. Pan
American, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding that airline’s policy against
hiring men for flight attendant positions violated Title VII); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pacific Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding company policy
against hiring women for positions involving physically strenuous work
violated Title VII); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir.
1969) (holding that employer cannot bar women from all jobs requiring
13
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takes the form of a per se refusal to hire women (or men)
because of their sex—what I refer to as ontological
discrimination.15 The discrimination that remains is more
subtle, nuanced, and often far less categorical. An employer
may be perfectly willing to hire women or men but may
simply refuse to hire women or men with particular traits. I
refer to this as trait discrimination. Trait discrimination may
be either sex-neutral or sex-specific. An employer may, for
example, simply have a neutral requirement against hiring
anyone with a particular trait, e.g. a pierced tongue.
Alternatively, an employer may find a particular trait
disqualifying only in individuals of one sex, e.g. crew cuts
on women, long hair on men. Title VII analyzes sex-neutral
trait discrimination using the disparate impact framework
but does not provide a framework for analyzing sex-specific
trait discrimination.
Once discrimination shifts from being ontological and
categorical in nature to being based on more complicated
interactions of traits plus sex—resulting in neither the total,
nor perhaps even disproportionate, exclusion of either sex
from particular jobs—it becomes far more difficult to know
how to respond. Discrimination by which all women are
excluded because they are women is easy to condemn, if not
lifting of more than 35 pounds); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273
(9th Cir. 1981) (holding that employer could not refuse to hire women for
management positions dealing with foreign clients based on a concern
that such clients would react negatively to dealing with a female
executive). See also Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on
Human Relations, 913 U.S. 376 (1973) (holding that newspaper could not
carry help wanted ads in sex designated columns). For a discussion of
the limited instances in which formally sex-based hiring continues see
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining
Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004).
15 Ontology means the study of being. See JOHN H. KOK, PATTERNS OF
THE WESTERN MIND 4 (1998); ROLLO MAY, THE DISCOVERY OF BEING:
WRITINGS IN EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY 91 (19983). I use the term
ontological discrimination to refer to discrimination that is status-based
in the most basic sense—all women or all men are excluded because of
their status as such.
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to eliminate. It is clear that such discrimination violates Title
VII. What is much less clear is how to treat discrimination
by employers that affects only particular women (or men)
rather than women (or men) as a group. Consider the
employer who regularly hires women but simply refuses to
hire women with short hair, or the employer who regularly
hires men by simply refuses to hire men with long hair. The
essential question of this paper is when, if ever, does such
sex-specific trait discrimination constitute actionable sex
discrimination under Title VII? 16
My purpose is primarily positive and descriptive.
Yet, the account I provide of when sex-specific
discrimination is actionable is based not solely or even
primarily on the text of Title VII—which is itself too sparse
and indeterminate to answer this question17—but instead on
the legislative history of Title VII’s sex amendment (also
concededly sparse) and the broader anti-caste goals of Title
VII’s sex (and race) provision(s). My argument is not,
therefore, a broad normative one about the kinds of
discrimination that are generally socially harmful and
should be prohibited. It is, instead, one of statutory
construction in which normative arguments are narrowly
focused on fulfilling the law’s own purposes and goals.18
Although this paper focuses on the appropriate treatment of sexspecific forms of trait discrimination challenged under a disparate
treatment framework, in fact, as will be discussed, the same core
question of when individuals should be protected in their possession of a
particular trait drives the analysis of trait discrimination claims under
both the disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses. See infra text
accompanying note __.
17 Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII makes it unlawful “to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).
18 This paper is part of a larger project and series of papers arguing that
what antidiscrimination laws require can never be understood or
defined in the abstract. What it means to not discriminate on the basis of
sex can only be understood by looking at the social context in which
16
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After framing the problem of this paper more fully by
expanding upon the differences between ontological and
trait-based discrimination, I assess the approaches to sexspecific trait discrimination that have been suggested by
scholars and the courts. I begin with the approach that
currently has the broadest support, what I call the “trait
equality” approach.
According to the trait equality
approach, an employer engages in actionable sex
discrimination anytime it penalizes an employee for
possessing a trait that the employer finds unobjectionable in
employees of the other sex. While the trait equality
approach may at first seem simple and straightforward, it is
in fact highly subjective and indeterminate.
More
importantly, even when viewed in its most sympathetic and
workable form, a trait equality requirement is not necessary
for substantive sex equality and, in practice, encourages a
workplace androgyny that has high costs in terms of
employee and employer liberty.
I next consider three other responses to the problem
of trait discrimination. The “fundamental/immutable trait”
approach prohibits sex-specific trait discrimination only
when the trait in question is, or reflects the exercise of, a
fundamental right—such as marital or parental status—or an
immutable characteristic—such as height. The “groupidentity” approach makes trait discrimination actionable
only when the trait at issue is integral to the employee’s
identity as a member of the protected group.
The
“mechanism of harm” approach focuses, unlike the other
approaches, not on the nature of the trait for which
particular women or men are being singled out for adverse
challenged behavior occurs and by focusing on the substantive social
goals
driving
a
particular
antidiscrimination
statute.
Nondiscrimination, in other words, is necessarily context-based and
informed by substantive social goals. See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko,
One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s Sex-Based Proportionality
Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions Defensible? 97 NW. U. L.
REV. 731 (2003); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies:
Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004).

7

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

treatment, but on the mechanism by which they are harmed.
The mechanism of harm approach makes actionable only
trait-based adverse treatment that is sexual in nature. All
three approaches, while suffering from a range of different
problems, suffer from the common flaw of being fatally
underinclusive.
All permit forms of sex-specific trait
discrimination which reinforce the very sex-based workworld hierarchy that Title VII was intended to dismantle.
In the final section of the paper, I present an
alternative response which I call the power/access approach.
This approach treats sex-specific trait discrimination as
actionable sex discrimination if the gender norms driving
the discrimination are ones that society has an equalitybased interest in eliminating. Consider, for example, the
gender norm that makes aggressive women look bitchy. An
employer may have no objection to hiring women generally
but may refuse to hire aggressive women while not objecting
to, and perhaps even prizing, aggressive men. Given how
important aggressiveness is for business and professional
success, if employers are permitted to discriminate against
aggressive women, then women generally will be impaired
in their ability to move up the corporate ranks and fully
integrate the work world. Equality for women in the
workplace requires the breakdown, or at least
nonenforcement, of the gender norm associating female
aggressiveness with bitchiness. Yet, not all gender norms
are created equal. Not all reinforce sex hierarchy in this way
and not all need to be eliminated in order for women and
men to compete on equal footing in the workplace. The
power/access approach makes actionable those, and only
those, types of sex-specific trait discrimination that arise out
of gender norms and gender scripts that reinforce sex
hierarchy in the workplace. This approach cures the under
and over inclusiveness problems of the other approaches by
focusing squarely on Title VII’s substantive goals and
recognizing that what nondiscrimination means is
necessarily socially contingent and context specific.

8
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Ultimately, this paper argues that Title VII’s
nondiscrimination mandate requires both more and less
than the formal equality and rigid neutrality that is currently
argued for most often. It requires more in that it demands
not only formal access to the world for women, but also a
change in the social norms and gender scripts that make it
more difficult for women to compete effectively in the work
world. It requires less in that it does not require the
elimination of, or blindness to, gender in all instances. The
social transformation Title VII requires is actually more
radical and more difficult than that of rigid gender-blind
neutrality. It is also, however, far more appealing.
I.

Ontological vs. Trait-Based Discrimination
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination that is
because of an individual’s sex. 19 At the most basic level
Title VII makes it illegal for an employer to refuse to hire or
promote women (or men) because of their status as such.20 I
refer to such status-based decision making as ontological
discrimination.
Not all ontological discrimination looks the same.
Efforts to exclude or disadvantage women (or men) may be
motivated by different goals and effected through different
mechanisms.

See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1).
See Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)
(“[T]he term sex should be given the traditional definition based on
anatomical characteristics”); Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., 231 F.3d 1080,
1084 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We have stated that ‘[t]he phrase in Title VII
prohibiting discrimination based on sex’ means that ‘it is unlawful to
discriminate against women because they are women and against men
because they are men.’ In other words, Congress intended the term ‘sex,’
to mean ‘biological male or biological female’”) (internal citation
omitted).
19
20

9
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Ontological Discrimination

Non Sexual Means

Motives
Exclusion
Blanket prohibition on
hiring women (or men)

Satisfy Customer Preferences
Sex-based hiring requirements
in order to satisfy customers'
preferences to work with
women (men)

Mechanism

Sexual Means

Sexual harassment of all
women (or men) in
workplace

Sex based hiring in order to
sell customers a particular type
of sexual titillation

As the figure above illustrates, sex-based ontological
discrimination may most obviously be motivated by the
employer’s desire to exclude women (or men) from the
workplace either because of animus or because of a belief
that women (or men) simply do not belong in certain
settings.21 Alternatively, ontological discrimination may be
motivated not by the employer’s own bias but by customer
preferences. An employer may engage in ontological
discrimination only because such discrimination is needed
to satisfy the demands of its customers.
Ontological discrimination motivated by the
employer’s desire to exclude may, moreover, be effected
through either non sexual or sexual means. An employer
The employer’s desire to exclude may reflect not only the biases of
owner and management, but also a desire to cater to the biases of one’s
workers.

21
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may simply exercise a formal or informal policy of not hiring
women (or men) to certain jobs.22
Alternatively, an
employer may attempt to exclude women (or men) by
encouraging or condoning sexual harassment of all women
(or men) who try to hold certain jobs.23
Ontological discrimination motivated by a desire to
satisfy customer preferences may be effected by similar
means. An employer may simply refuse to hire women (or
men) because it is trying to provide a particular kind of
gendered, albeit non-sexual, ambience,24 or because its
customer base is more comfortable working with women (or

See BARBARA F. RESKIN AND HEIDI I. HARTMANN, eds., WOMEN’S WORK,
MEN’S WORK: SEX SEGREGATION ON THE JOB 47-50 (1986) (presenting
numerous examples of formal discrimination against women in
employment). See also Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1980)
(describing formal policies of discrimination against women held by the
Toledo, Ohio police department and in effect both before and after Title
VII); Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp., 1147, 1150, 1161-62 (D.D.C. 1979)
(describing formal practices of exclusion and segregation of women in
the bookbinding industry).
23 See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (“’Sexual
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality’”) (citation
omitted); Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1496, 1498 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (women workers were subjected to pornography, sexual
comments, physical touching and being told the men did not want to
work with them); Hall v. Gus Const. Co. Inc., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988)
(women on road construction crew targeted for harassment of sexual
and non sexual nature because they were women). See also Carol
Kleiman, Harassment Suit at Stroh Brewery Puts Focus on Company’s Own
Ads, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 1992, at 6 (describing lawsuit brought by female
workers at Stroh’s bottling plant alleging that female workers were
subjected to physical and verbal harassment of both a sexual and non
sexual nature aimed at excluding women from the workplace).
24
See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab., Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000)
(practice of hiring male only food servers in order to maintain
restaurant's "Old World" ambience was evidence of disparate treatment
discrimination in violation of Title VII)
22
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men) in particular situations.25 Alternatively, an employer
may require that its workers provide sexual titillation to
customers and hire only female or male employees
accordingly.26
The EEOC Guidelines interpreting Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination explicitly prohibit sexbased hiring in order to satisfy customer preferences.27 In
practice, however, discrimination of this sort is often
permitted in two types of cases: those in which sex
discrimination is necessary in order to protect customers'
privacy interests and those in which sex discrimination is
necessary in order to provide customers with sexual
titillation where sexual titillation is the employer's only or
See Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971)
(policy of hiring women only as flight attendants on grounds that
passengers preferred female flight attendants violated Title VII);
Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (challenging
employer’s argument that being male was a requirement for the position
of Vice President of International Operations because Latin American
clients would react negatively to a woman in this position); Olsen v.
Marriott International Inc., 75 F. Supp.2d 1052 (1999) (challenging
employer’s policy of favoring female massage therapists in hiring
because of customers’ preferences for female over male therapists);
EEOC v. Hi Corp., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (involving a
challenge to a weight loss center’s policy of hiring only female weight
loss counselors on the grounds that customers overwhelmingly
preferred to work with female as opposed to male counselors).
26 See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
(hiring only women to high customer contact positions of flight
attendant and ticket agent in order to provide sexual titillation to
predominately male customer base); Guardian Capital Corp. v. New York
State Division of Human Rights, 360 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1974) (hiring only
female food servers in order to provide customers with sexualized
female gaze objects as well as food).
27 The EEOC's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex provide:
"(a)(1) The Commission will find that the following situations do not
warrant the application of the bona fide occupational qualification
exception . . .
(iii)
The refusal to hire an individual because of the
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers . . . .”
29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a).
25
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primary good for sale.28 Courts permit such discrimination,
and avoid Title VII’s prohibition on ontological
discrimination, by concluding that sex is a bona fide
occupational qualification for the position at issue.29
Notwithstanding this relatively narrow exception, however,
ontological discrimination was Title VII’s paradigmatic
target.30
Sometimes, though, an employer does not seek to
exclude all women or all men from a particular position but
only those with particular traits or attributes. The exclusion
may be sex-neutral if the employer simply refuses to hire
any woman or man with a particular trait—e.g. tattoos or
blue hair. The exclusion becomes sex-specific, however, if
the employer enforces a hiring requirement on one sex but
not the other, e.g. women may not look masculine, men may
not act feminine.
For a fuller discussion of the exceptions to Title VII's prohibition on
sex discrimination driven by customer preferences for privacy and
sexual titillation see Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies, supra
note __.
29
Title VII includes an exception to its general antidiscrimination
mandate which permits discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or
national origin in “instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise.” Title VII Section
703(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(e)(1)(1998).
30 The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., explained:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is
plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
identifiable group of white employees over other
employees.
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). The Court then emphasized that
“[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed.” Id. at 431. See also Sex
Discrimination, 84 HARV. L. REV. at 1170 (noting that “[t]he paradigm case
of explicit sex discrimination is where sex itself, as a broad generic
classification, is the sole basis of the action taken by the employer. Such
a case occurs when an employer simply refuses to hire women for a
certain position”); see also supra notes 13-14.
28
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Sex-specific trait discrimination, like ontological
discrimination, may be motivated by either an employer's
own desire (stemming from animus or a sense of
inappropriate fit) to exclude women or men with a
particular trait, or by an employer's desire to satisfy
customer preferences. Such trait discrimination may also be
effected by either sexual or nonsexual mechanisms.

Sex – Specific Trait Discrimination
Motives
Non Sexual Means

Exclusion
Prohibition on hiring some
subgroup of women (or men)

Satisfy Customer Preferences
Refusal to hire women (or
men) with certain
characteristics because of
customer preferences

Sexual harassment only of
women (or men) with
particular characteristics

Willingness to hire only
women (or men) who can
provide customers with
sexual titillation

Mechanism

Sexual Means

An employer may, for example, believe that it is
inappropriate for women with small children to be
employed full-time and, therefore, may refuse to hire
women with small children while being willing to hire men
with small children.31 The trait discrimination is motivated
by a desire to exclude some subgroup of women because of
a sense of their inappropriate fit in the workplace, and the
discrimination itself is effected by nonsexual means--that is
by direct prohibition. Alternatively, an employer may not
like effeminate men while not minding feminine women and
may condone or participate in the sexualized harassment of
See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (involving a
challenge to an employer’s policy of refusing to hire women but not men
with preschool age children).

31
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such men by others in the workplace.32 The discrimination
is again motivated by a desire to exclude men of a particular
type, but the means of effecting the exclusion are taunts and
harassment that are sexual in nature.33
An employer may also engage in sex-specific trait
discrimination in order to satisfy customer preferences. An
employer may willingly hire men, for example, but refuse to
hire men who wear dresses--while not objecting to women
in dresses--because of a concern that men in dresses will
alienate and offend customers.34 Alternatively, an employer
may hire women but only those whom its customers find
physically and sexually appealing while imposing no similar
requirements on male employees.35
While ontological discrimination is clearly targeted by
Title VII, and has diminished significantly since its passage,
the effect of Title VII on sex-specific trait discrimination is
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (man
working on offshore oil platform was singled out and subject to sexual
taunts and assaults apparently because he was perceived as
insufficiently masculine); Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256
F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001) (male waiter subject to sexual harassment because
he was judged to be too feminine by his male co-workers); Doe v. City of
Belleville, IL, 119 F.3d 563 (1997) (teenage brothers singled out for sexual
harassment by male co-workers because of their perceived effeminacy),
vacated by 523 U.S 1001 (1998).
33 It is worth noting that cases of sexual harassment may involve either
ontological or trait-based discrimination.
34 See e.g., Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2002 WL 31098541 (E.D. La.
Sept. 16, 2002) (terminating male delivery truck driver who sometimes
dressed and appeared in public as a woman during his off duty hours on
the grounds that employer's customers would not approve of such
behavior).
35 See e.g., Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982)
(involving a challenge to an airline policy of imposing strict weight
requirements on female flight attendants as a condition of their
employment because the employer sought to compete in industry by
featuring attractive female attendants); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
366 F. Supp. 763 (D.C.D.C. 1973) (involving a challenge to an employer
policy of imposing weight requirements and no eyeglass policy on
female but not male flight attendants).
32
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more uncertain. Courts and scholars have struggled to
decide whether, and if so when, sex-specific trait
discrimination violates Title VII’s nondiscrimination
mandate.
II.

Trait Equality Approach
Currently, the dominant response to sex-specific trait
discrimination is to argue that women should be permitted
to possess any trait or attribute that men are permitted to
possess in the workplace, and vice versa.
It is sex
discrimination, the argument goes, for individuals of one sex
to be disadvantaged for engaging in an activity or
possessing an attribute that the employer deems perfectly
acceptable when possessed or engaged in by individuals of
the other sex. In this section I describe the scholarly and
judicial support for this approach before emphasizing its
conceptual and normative weaknesses.
A.

Scholarly Support
Mary Anne Case has provided the strongest and most
articulate defense of the trait equality approach.36 According
to Case, trait equality both already is, and should be,
demanded by antidiscrimination law.37 Just as women are
protected under Title VII from adverse employment actions
when they adopt the traits and attributes that are considered
acceptable (or desirable, or required) in men, so too must
men be protected when they adopt traits and attributes that
are considered acceptable in women.38 According to Case,
See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual
Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105
YALE L. J. 1, 7 (1995). Case herself, however, does not use this phrase.
37 Case contends that effeminate men “as well as . . . men who violate
sex-specific grooming codes by wearing feminine attire to work . . . are
clearly protected by both the plain language of Title VII and the holding
in Hopkins. If their employer tolerates feminine behavior or attire in
women but not in them, the employer is subjecting them to disparate
treatment in violation of Title VII.” Id. at 7. Case, supra note __ at 7.
38 See Case, supra note __ at 49.
36
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“one need not go beyond the plain language of [Title VII] to
find explicit protection for [the] . . . hypothetical 'male
employee who routinely appeared for work in skirts and
dresses,' at least if the skirts and dresses were of a sort the
employer did not object to its female employees wearing.'"39
Case, somewhat hopefully, views the trait equality
approach as a means of elevating that which has been
traditionally feminine. 40 “It is my contention,” she explains,
“that, unfortunately, the world will not be safe for women in
frilly pink dresses—they will not, for example, generally be
as respected as either men or women in gray flannel suits—
unless and until it is made safe for men in dresses as well.”41
Case’s desire to elevate the feminine, as opposed to simply
elevating and protecting women, is odd given that Case
both clearly sees the feminine as distinct from femaleness
and also seems to have no independent attachment to the
feminine per se. 42 Indeed, Case says: “I would be neither
particularly surprised nor particularly disappointed if
masculinity and femininity as we today define them were to
be amalgamated, to be diversified, or to wither away in
future generations.”43 Perhaps more odd, however, is her
optimism in the trait equality approach as a mechanism for
such elevation. As Case notes, the trait equality approach
does not itself require employers to permit men to wear
Case, supra note __ at 49.
See Case, supra note __ at 3 (“We are in danger of substituting for
prohibited sex discrimination a still acceptable gender discrimination,
that is to say, discrimination against the stereotypically feminine,
especially when manifested by men, but also when manifested by
women”).
41 Id. at 7.
42 According to Case, “it is important to those feminists who wish to see
feminine styles more generally valued, rather than gradually eliminated
as they may be in an androgynous culture slanted toward the masculine,
that the protections of Title VII be seen as extending even to men in
dresses.” Id. at 7.
43 Id. at 76. Indeed, Case explains that she worries “about two sorts of
potential gender essentialism—not merely the essentializing of women
as feminine, but the essentializing of the feminine itself.” Id. at 76
39
40
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frilly pink dresses to work, it only requires that if the
employer allows women to wear such outfits it must allow
men to do so as well.44 It is highly uncertain, as Case
acknowledges, that employers bound by the strictures of the
trait equality approach would respond by expanding the
clothing and grooming options available to both sexes rather
than prohibiting everyone from wearing pink frilly dresses.45
However, even if employers were to respond to a trait
equality requirement by making gendered clothing and
grooming styles options for both sexes, it remains far from
clear that doing so would serve to elevate the traditionally
feminine as opposed to increasing its marginalization by
linking in the workplace stereotypically feminine women
and men in drag. Nonetheless, despite her perhaps overly
optimistic instrumental hopes for the trait equality
approach, Case views the approach as clearly mandated by
Title VII.
Taylor Flynn, too, argues in favor of a trait equality
approach to sex discrimination and interprets it in a
similarly literalistic way.46 Flynn contends that “a male
employee fired for wearing an earring should have a claim
under Title VII because he was discriminated against for
failing to conform to the masculine gender role expectation
that men do not accessorize.”47
Flynn sees gender
nonconformity as at the core of both sex and sexual
orientation discrimination and sees the trait equality
Id. at 7-8.
Case “acknowledge[s] the risks in insisting that employers impose the
same grooming standards on men and women: Haunted by the specter
of a man in a dress, employers may choose to impose a unisex,
conventionally masculine grooming code on all employees; this would
not only further reduce employee liberty but also further reinforce the
supremacy of masculine standards and the decline of the feminine.” Id
at 7-8.
46 See Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 392, 394 (2002).
47 Id. at 401.
44
45
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requirement, again perhaps too optimistically, as a way to
free gender nonconformists from traditional gender
expectations. 48
B.

Case Law
The trait equality approach has also been popular
with courts, but only up to a point. The approach has been
used by courts to target discrimination against masculine
women and effeminate men. Courts have been largely
unwilling, however, to use the approach as a means of
targeting employment discrimination based on sexual
orientation or that based on male cross-dressing.
1.

Aggressive/Masculine Women
The trait equality approach was most clearly
articulated by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.49 Ann Hopkins had worked in the Washington
D.C. office of Price Waterhouse for five years when the
partners in that office proposed her for partnership in 1982.50
Hopkins was one of 88 persons proposed for partnership
that year and the only woman.51 The district court judge
who initially heard Hopkins’ case found that “’[n]one of the
other partnership candidates at Price Waterhouse that year
had a comparable record in terms of successfully securing
major contracts for the partnership.’”52
Nevertheless,
Id. at 393. Katherine Franke, has made a similar argument that
gender role enforcement is at the core of sex discrimination and should,
therefore, be the focus of Title VII. According to Franke, “Title VII
should recognize the primacy of gender norms as the root of both sexual
identity and sex discrimination, and thereby the law should prohibit all
forms of normative gender stereotyping regardless of the biological sex
of any of the parties involved.” Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake
of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144 U.PA.
L. REV. 1, 95 (1995).
49 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
50 490 U.S. at 233.
51 490 U.S. at 233. At the time Hopkins was considered for partner, Price
Waterhouse had 662 partners of whom 7 were women. Id.
52 490 U.S. at 234, quoting district court opinion at 618 F. Supp. at 1112.
48
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Hopkins was passed over for partnership and held for
reconsideration the following year.53
The man who was assigned by Price Waterhouse to
tell Hopkins why her candidacy had been held over
provided her with several suggestions for improving her
chances the following year. He told her she should “’walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more
femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry,’”54 After the partners in her office refused to repropose her for the partnership, Hopkins sued alleging that
she had been discriminated against because of her sex in
violation of Title VII.55
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court made clear
that it was actionable sex discrimination in violation of Title
VII to penalize an employee for possessing traits or
attributes that would have been acceptable in individuals of
the other sex. The Court held that “an employer who acts on
the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or
that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender.”56
The Supreme Court described its holding in Price Waterhouse
as reinforcing Title VII’s prohibition on “gender
stereotyping,” and the Court had no difficulty concluding
Of the 88 people proposed for partnership that year, forty seven were
admitted to the partnership, twenty one were rejected and twenty were
held for reconsideration the following year. Id. at 233.
54 490 U.S. at 235. As part of the partnership consideration process,
several partners at Price Waterhouse submitted comments regarding
Hopkins’ candidacy. Several of these comments also touched on
Hopkins’s apparent gender inappropriateness. “One partner described
her as ‘macho’; another suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a
woman’; a third advised her to take ‘a course at charm school.’ Several
partners criticized her use of profanity; in response, one partner
suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s
a lady using foul language.’ Another supporter explained that Hopkins
‘ha[d] matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
mgr to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady ptr
candidate.’” Id. at 235, internal citations omitted.
55 490 U.S. at 232.
56 490 U.S. at 250.
53
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that such impermissible gender stereotyping had occurred in
this case.57
Despite the Supreme Court’s characterization of its
holding as prohibiting gender stereotyping, it is more
precise and more accurate to describe the holding as
endorsing a trait equality requirement. The term gender
stereotyping has been used by courts to refer to and prohibit
very distinct kinds of biases.
Gender stereotyping
sometimes refers to the erroneous attribution of traits and
attributes to a particular individual because of that person’s
membership in a particular social group. For example,
gender stereotyping may refer to the process by which one
assumes that a particular woman is physically weak,
uncommitted to her career in the long term, or emotionally
vulnerable, because these are attributes associated with
women as a group.58 Courts have, in the employment
context and in other contexts, repeatedly prohibited gender
stereotyping of this sort.59 The gender stereotyping the
According to the Court, “It takes no special training to discern sex
stereotyping in a description of an aggressive female employee as
requiring ‘a course at charm school.’ Nor, . . . .does it require expertise in
psychology to know that, if an employee’s flawed ‘interpersonal skills’
can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a new shade of lipstick, perhaps it
is the employee’s sex and not her interpersonal skills that has drawn the
criticism.” 490 U.S. at 256.
58 See e.g., Grube v. Lau Industries, Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that it is a gender stereotype to assume that women should be
the primary caregivers in their families); Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric
Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 134 (3rd Cir. 1996) (noting that historical restrictions on
women’s ability to hold certain jobs arising from employers’ concern for
women’s health and well-being were often based on gender stereotypes);
Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that employer’s
evaluation of job candidates’ leadership abilities reflected gender
stereotyped notions about the characteristics likely possessed by women
and men).
59 See e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (striking down a
federal statute providing dependent benefits for spouses of male service
members but providing the same benefits to the spouses of female
service members only upon their showing actual dependence for over
one-half their support); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194, 1198-99
57
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Court prohibited in Price Waterhouse is, however, entirely
different. It involves not the erroneous attribution of groupassociated traits to individual group members, but the
requirement that individuals actually possess the traits and
attributes deemed acceptable for their sex rather than those
deemed acceptable and appropriate for the other sex.
Referring to a prohibition of this latter type of gender
stereotyping as a trait equality requirement helps to clarify
which distinct type of “stereotyping” is in fact at issue.60
Additionally, “gender stereotyping” does not fully
capture what the Court found problematic about the
decision making in Price Waterhouse. Although the Supreme
Court boldly stated that “we are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or
insisting that they matched the stereotypes associated with
their groups,”61 the conduct the Supreme Court was
prohibiting was more narrowly defined than this statement
suggests. It is unlikely, for example, that the Court meant
that a bank could not fire a teller who showed up to work in
a Barney costume on the grounds that doing so
discriminated against the employee for not matching the
stereotypes of proper dress associated with her sex. The
Court was not intending to hold that adverse employment
action based on any conduct that deviated from gender
stereotypes constituted sex-based discrimination. Rather,
the Court intended to protect individuals from adverse
employment actions resulting from their possession of
attributes that would be acceptable to the employer if
possessed by individuals of the other sex. Again, although
(7th Cir. 1971) (striking down the employer’s no marriage rule for female
but not male flight personnel because based on sex stereotypes about
women’s domestic role); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (striking down a
state law which, all else being equal, chose men over women to be estate
executors).
60 For a fuller discussion of different types of stereotyping see Andrew
Koppelman, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 131-36
(1996).
61 490 U.S. at 251.
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the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse said it was
prohibiting gender stereotyping, the decision is better
thought of as an articulation of a trait equality requirement.
Lower courts have used Price Waterhouse to provide
Title VII protection to similarly non gender conforming
women. In Heller v. Columbia Edgwater Country Club,62 for
example, the plaintiff was subjected to a constant barrage of
insults focused on her perceived gender inappropriate
clothing and her lesbianism. Applying the logic of trait
equality, the court concluded that the harassment Heller
suffered because of her masculine traits and appearance
constituted discrimination because of sex.63
2.

Effeminate Men
The trait equality approach has had its greatest
impact, however, not in protecting aggressive/masculine
women but in protecting effeminate men singled out for
harassment by other men in mixed sex or predominately
male environments. Oddly, nowhere in the Supreme
Court’s 1997 decision in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services,64 in which it held that same-sex sexual harassment
could be actionable under Title VII, did the Court rely on or
even mention the gender stereotyping/trait equality
approach to sex discrimination outlined in Price Waterhouse.
See Heller v. Columbia Edgewater Country Club, 195 F. Supp.2d 1212 (D.
Or. 2002).
63
According to the court: “Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff, a jury could find that Cagle repeatedly
harassed (and ultimately discharged) Heller because Heller did not
conform to Cagle’s stereotype of how a woman ought to behave. . . .
[T]he impetus for the comments about Heller’s ‘faggy’ shoes was that
Cagle perceived them to be men’s shoes. Cagle also allegedly made a
number of comments along the lines of ‘I thought you were the man,’ ‘I
thought you wore the pants,’ and asked Heller who ‘w[ore] the dick in
the relationship.’” Heller, 195 F. Supp.2d at 1224. The court also took the
unusual step of extending the trait equality logic to find actionable
harassment Heller suffered because of her lesbianism. Id. at __. See text
accompanying note 79.
64 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1997).
62
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The Court in Oncale offered three “evidentiary route[s]”65 by
which a plaintiff could show that he was discriminated
against because of sex: first, the plaintiff could show that the
same-sex harassment was motivated by sexual desire and
therefore presumably would not have happened to someone
of the other sex; second, the plaintiff could show that the
harasser was motivated by general hostility to persons of
plaintiff’s sex in the workplace; or third, the plaintiff could
offer direct comparative evidence showing that the harasser
treated women and men differently in a mixed-sex
workplace. While the Supreme Court did not mention the
gender stereotyping/trait equality rationale of Price
Waterhouse as a means of finding same sex harassment
actionable, nor did it refute this approach. As a result,
courts continue to apply this approach in order to find at
least some male-male harassment actionable under Title
VII.66
In Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc.,67 for
example, the Ninth Circuit applied the trait equality
approach to conclude that abuse the plaintiff suffered
constituted actionable sex discrimination under Title VII.
Antonio Sanchez worked as a host and then food server at
Azteca restaurants in Washington state. During his four
year tenure at Azteca, Sanchez was subjected to a steady
Id. at 81.
The reconciling of Oncale and Price Waterhouse by the Third Circuit in
Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, is fairly standard.
According to the Third Circuit, “[a]bsent an explicit statement from the
Supreme Court that it is turning its back on Price Waterhouse, there is no
reason to believe” that the Oncale decision was meant to call the gender
stereotyping/trait equality theory of sex discrimination into question. Id.
at 263 n.5. But see David S. Schwartz, When is Sex Because of Sex? The
Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1743
(2002) (“In light of all the ways that a sex-stereotyping theory should
have come to the Court’s attention, the complete failure of the Oncale
opinion to address the sex-stereotyping theory of harassment, along with
its failure to identify sex-stereotyping as an “evidentiary route” for
proving “because of sex,” is notable and disturbing.”).
67 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
65
66
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stream of taunts and insults focusing on his perceived
effeminacy.68 At a bench trial, the district court judge held
that the harassment Sanchez allegedly suffered had not been
“because of” sex within the meaning of Title VII. The Court
of Appeals disagreed. According to the court, “[a]t its
essence, the systematic abuse directed at Sanchez reflected a
belief that Sanchez did not act as a man should act.”69
Relying on Price Waterhouse, the court concluded that such
abuse—based as it was on the perception that Sanchez
possessed traits and attributes that while acceptable for a
woman were inappropriate for a man—constituted
harassment “because of” sex.70

According to the court, “ [m]ale co-workers and a supervisor
repeatedly referred to Sanchez in Spanish and English as ‘she’ and ‘her.’
Male co-workers mocked Sanchez for walking and carrying his serving
tray ‘like a woman,’ and taunted him in Spanish and English as, among
other things, a ‘faggot’ and a ‘fucking female whore.’” Nichols, 256 F.3d
at 870.
69 Nichols, 256 F.3d 874.
70 Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875. The Ninth Circuit faced a similar case one
year later in Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc). Medina Rene worked as a butler on an exclusive floor of the
MGM Grand Hotel reserved for wealthy and famous guests. All of the
other butlers on the floor were male. Rene was subjected to a constant
stream of abuse from his supervisor and fellow butlers. The conduct
included “whistling and blowing kisses at Rene, calling him ‘sweetheart’
and ‘munea’ (Spanish for ‘doll’), telling crude jokes and giving sexually
oriented ‘joke’ gifts, and forcing Rene to look at pictures of naked men
having sex.” Id. at 1064. The abuse was also often physical. Rene was
“caressed and hugged,” his co-workers would “’touch [his] body like
they would to a woman,’” and “they grabbed him in the crotch and
poked their fingers in his anus through his clothing.” Id. at 1064. In an
en banc decision the court held that Rene had stated a claim for sexual
harassment in violation of Title VII. In a plurality opinion of the court,
Judge Fletcher (joined by Judges Trott, Graver and Fisher), concluded
that the alleged harassment was “because of” sex because of the sexual
nature of the abuse. Id. at 1066-68. In a concurring opinion Judge
Pregerson (joined by judges Trott and Berzon), reached the same result
for different reasons. According to Pregerson, the case was better
understood as a gender stereotyping case in which Rene was harassed
68
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Similarly, in Doe v. City of Belleville,71 the Seventh
Circuit ruled that the harassment of two boys who were
perceived by their male co-workers as insufficiently
masculine constituted sex discrimination under Title VII. 72
City of Belleville involved the harassment of two sixteen year
old brothers working for the City for the summer tending
the grounds of a municipal cemetery. Both brothers were
subjected to taunts and abuse by their male co-workers, but
one of the brothers, H. Doe, was the main target. 73 The

because he had traits that were deemed appropriate for a woman but not
a man. Id. at 1068-69.
71 Doe v. City of Belleville, IL.,119 F.3d 563 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Belleville was vacated by the Supreme Court for
further consideration in light of its decision in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services. The case then settled before there was a decision on
remand. Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 263 n.5 (3rd
Cir. 2001). The Supreme Court’s decision in Oncale did not, however,
directly challenge or retract the gender stereotyping logic set forth in
Price Waterhouse on which the Belleville decision relied. See id. (opining
that “there was nothing in Oncale, . . . that would call into question” the
holding in Belleville that harassment based on failure to live up to gender
stereotypes was sex discrimination).
72
The Circuit Court noted: “The Supreme Court’s decision in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, . . . makes clear that Title VII does not permit an
employee to be treated adversely because his or her appearance or
conduct does not conform to stereotypical gender roles.” Belleville, 119
F.3d at 580. The court also suggested, however, that an alternative and
independent ground for its conclusion that the harassment in that case
was “because of” sex was the simple fact that the harassment of H. was
explicitly sexual in nature. Id. at 576-580. It is this suggestion that the
Supreme Court explicitly rejects in Oncale. See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80
(“We have never held that workplace harassment, even harassment
between men and women, is automatically discrimination because of sex
merely because the words used have sexual content or connotations”).
73 The court noted that the parties had focused most of their attention on
the harassment suffered by H. Doe rather than that suffered by his
brother J. Doe, and that it was the harassment suffered by H. “that most
vividly illustrates why same-sex harassment is actionable as sex
discrimination.” Belleville, 119 F.3d at 569. However, because both the
parties and the district court addressed the Does’ claims collectively and
the city “made no meaningful effort to distinguish J. Doe’s claims from
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harassment of H. focused primarily on the fact that he wore
an earring and was perceived as overly feminine.74 In
concluding that the plaintiffs had presented evidence
sufficient to show that they had been harassed “because of”
sex, the Seventh Circuit relied directly on the Supreme
Court’s gender stereotyping/trait equality rationale from
Price Waterhouse. The court explained that “a man who is
harassed because his voice is soft, his physique is slight, his
hair is long, or because in some other respect he exhibits his
masculinity in a way that does not meet his coworkers’ idea
of how men are to appear and behave is harassed ‘because
of’ his sex.”75
his brother’s,” the court concluded that both brothers were entitled to a
trial on their sex discrimination claims. Id. at 569.
74 Most of the abuse H. suffered was at the hands of one co-worker Jeff
Dawe, a former Marine. Dawe “constantly referred to H. as ‘queer’ and
‘fag’ and urged H. to “go back to San Francisco with the rest of the
queers.’ Dawe also repeatedly inquired of H., ‘Are you a boy or a girl?’
Dawe soon took to calling H. his ‘bitch’ and said that he was going to
take him ‘out to the woods’ and ‘get [him] up the ass.’” Belleville, 119
F.3d at 567. On one occasion Dawe walked toward H. saying “’I’m going
to finally find out if you are a girl or a guy.’” Id. at 567. Dawe then
grabbed H. by the testicles and announced, “’Well, I guess he’s a guy.’”
Id. at 567.
75 Belleville, 119 F.3d at 581. Several other circuits have also noted in dicta
that Title VII requires trait equality. See e.g., Bibby, 260 F.3d at 262
(noting that “a plaintiff may be able to prove that same-sex harassment
was discrimination because of sex by presenting evidence that the
harasser’s conduct was motivated by a belief that the victim did not
conform to the stereotypes of his or her gender”); Simonton v. Runyon,
232 F.3d 33, 28 (stating that “[t]he Court in Price Waterhouse implied that
a suit alleging harassment or disparate treatment based upon non
conformity with sexual stereotypes is cognizable under Title VII as
discrimination because of sex”); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,
194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that “just as a woman can ground
an action on a claim that men discriminated against her because she did
not meet stereotyped expectations of femininity, a man can ground a
claim on evidence that other men discriminated against him because he
did not meet stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”). See also Martin
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 224 F. Supp.2d 434, 447
(N.D. N.Y. 2002) (recognizing sex stereotyping as a form of sex
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A Massachusetts district court applied the same
analysis in Centola vs. Potter. 76 Stephen Centola worked as a
letter carrier for the Postal Service for over seven years.
During his employment he was subjected to “constant”
sexually derogatory comments and jokes, most of which
seemed related to his perceived effeminacy and
homosexuality.77 In denying the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, the court held that the plaintiff had
presented sufficient evidence of sex discrimination by
showing that his co-workers “punished him because they
perceived him to be impermissibly feminine for a man.”78
Despite courts’ use of the trait equality approach as a
means of providing Title VII protection to effeminate men,
courts have, by and large, not used the trait equality
approach to prohibit discrimination against employees who
engage in same-sex sexual relations or that against men who

discrimination but finding that the plaintiff did not present any evidence
showing that he was or was perceived by his co-workers to be
effeminate); Ianetta v. Putnam Investments, Inc., 142 F. Supp.2d 131 (D.
Mass. 2001) (finding that plaintiff had stated a cause of action under Title
VII where he alleged that he was discriminated against because he did
not conform to the male gender stereotype).
76 183 F. Supp.2d 403 (D. Mass. 2002).
77 Although Centola was gay, according to the court, “he never disclosed
his sexual orientation to any of his co-workers or managers.” Centola,
183 F.Supp.2d at 407. The court described the harassment endured by
Centola as follows: “On one occasion, Centola’s co-workers placed a sign
stating ‘Heterosexual replacement on Duty’ at his case [work space]. Coworkers taped pictures of Richard Simmons ‘in pink hot pants’ to
Centola’s case. Fellow carriers asked Centola if he would be marching in
a gay parade and asked him if he had gotten AIDS yet. At other times,
his co-workers called him a ‘sword swallower’ and anti-gay epithets.
His co-workers also placed cartoons mocking gay men at his case.” Id. at
407 (internal citations omitted).
78
The court concluded that a reasonable jury could conclude that
“Centola’s co-workers harassed him because Centola did not conform
with their ideas about what ‘real’ men should look or act like. Just as
Ann Hopkins was vilified for not being ‘feminine’ enough, Centola was
vilified for not being more ‘manly.’” Id. at 410.

28

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

wear women’s clothing.79 The Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Belleville is typical. While endorsing the trait equality
approach as a way to find discrimination based on male
effeminacy actionable under Title VII, the court,
nevertheless, concluded that Title VII did not prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation.80
See e.g., Case, supra note __; Taylor, supra note __; David S. Schwartz,
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1773-74 (2002) ("Embracing a sexstereotyping theory in a same-sex harassment case would be tantamount
to extending Title VII harassment protection to lesbians, gays, and
gender nonconformists. Such discrimination is inevitably based on the
perception that the target of the discrimination has failed to adopt
behavior—gender or sexual behavior—deemed suitable to his or her sex,
and is therefore discrimination 'because of . . . sex' under a plain
language reading of Title VII"); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of ‘Sex,’ ‘Gender,’ and ‘Sexual
Orientation’ in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 125-26
(1995) ("[W]hile sex and gender discrimination are formally illegal and
sexual orientation discrimination is not, it is impossible (by conflationary
definition) to practice 'sexual orientation' discrimination without also
and simultaneously committing sex and gender discrimination");
Catharine A. MacKinnon for National Organization on Male Sexual
Victimization, et al., United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Oncale
v. Sundowner Services, in support of Oncale, 1997 WL 471814 *28 ("When
individuals are sexually harassed because of the sex of their sexual
partners, real or imagined, they are harassed because of sex. First,
formally speaking, those harassed because they are gay men or lesbian
women are harassed because of the gender of their sexual partners and
identification. If their own gender, or that of their loved ones, were
different, they would not be so treated”); ANDREW KOPPELMAN,
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 154-58 (1996) (using
trait equality logic to argue that sexual orientation discrimination is a
form of sex discrimination).
80
See Belleville, 119 F.3d at 593 (endorsing the trait equality/gender
stereotyping logic of Price Waterhouse but noting that “[t]he courts have
widely agreed that discrimination based on sexual orientation (actual or
perceived), as opposed to sex, is beyond the purview of Title VII”).
Courts generally seem bolstered by Congress’s express refusal to extend
Title VII protection to discrimination based on sexual orientation. See e.g.
Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *4 n. 53 (listing the thirty one proposed bills
introduced into the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives between
1981-2001which have “attempted to amend Title VII and prohibit
79
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Courts likewise have refused to use trait equality
logic as a means of prohibiting discrimination against male
cross-dressers.81 In Nichols, for example, the Ninth Circuit,
employment discrimination on the basis of affectional or sexual
orientation,” and emphasizing that none of them have passed). See also
Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35,38 (noting in dicta that Title VII does prohibit
discrimination based on nonconformity with sexual stereotypes but
emphasizing that “[t]he law is well-settled in this circuit and in all others
to have reached the question that . . . Title VII does not prohibit
harassment or discrimination because of sexual orientation”); Spearman,
231 F.3d at 1085-86 (recognizing that “sex stereotyping may constitute
evidence of sex discrimination” but emphasizing that Title VII “does not
prohibit harassment in general or of one’s homosexuality in particular”);
Bibby, 260 F.3d at 264-65 (affirming grant of summary judgment to
defendants because Title VII protects against discrimination based upon
gender stereotypes but not against discrimination based on sexual
orientation); Martin v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 224 F.
Supp.2d 434, 446 (N.D. N.Y. 2002) (granting defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on grounds that plaintiff was unable to show the
harassment he suffered was because of his nonconformity with sex
stereotypes rather than because of his sexual orientation which is not
protected under Title VII).
There have, however, been rare exceptions to this unwillingness
to use trait equality logic to prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation. See e.g., Centola v. Potter, 183 F.Supp.2d at 410 (suggesting
that the trait equality logic used to find Title VII protection for men
discriminated against because of their effeminacy should also provide
protection for men discriminated against because they choose to date
men instead of women); Heller, 195 F. Supp.2d at 1223 (concluding that
harassment because of plaintiff’s lesbianism as well as harassment
because of her perceived masculinity was actionable discrimination
because of sex).
81 See e.g., Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment on grounds that male employee who was
terminated for dressing and acting like a woman during off work hours
was not discriminated against because of sex); Dobre v. National Railroad
Passenger Corporation, 850 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that
plaintiff,
a male to female transsexual, who claimed she was
discriminated against by, among other things, being forced to dress as a
man, could not state a claim for sex discrimination); Tavora v. New York
Mercantile Exchange, 101 F.3d 907 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that it did not
violate Title VII for an employer to require male employees to have short
hair but imposing no similar restriction on female employees); Lockart v.
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while holding that harassment of an effeminate man
constituted sex discrimination, emphasized the limits of its
holding: "We do not imply that all gender-based distinctions
are actionable under Title VII. For example, our decision
does not imply that there is any violation of Title VII
occasioned by reasonable regulations that require male and
female employees to conform to different dress and
grooming standards."82 The Supreme Court too suggested in
Oncale that its trait equality logic does not extend this far.83

Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 795 P.2d 602, 604 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that it
did not constitute sex discrimination under Oregon law for an employer
to fire a man for wearing an earring when female employees were
permitted to do the same thing); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., 507
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that company policy prohibiting long
hair for male employees but not for female employees did not violate
Title VII). But see Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (D.C.
Cal. 1972) (dress and grooming code constitutes sexual discrimination
when applied differently to males and females); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of
America, 337 F. Supp. 1357 (D.C. Cal. 1972) (rule requiring short hair on
men but not on women violated Title VII); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc.,
337 F. Supp. 1055 (D.C. Ohio 1971) (rule allowing female employees to
wear hairnets but requiring male employees to wear hats—and therefore
keep their hair short—constituted sex discrimination).
82 Nichols, 256 F.3d at 874-75 (finding that the plaintiff was harassed for
not acting "as a man should act" and for having "feminine mannerisms"
and concluding that such harassment was "because of sex.").
83
The Supreme Court in Oncale noted that "[t]he prohibition of
harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny
in the workplace." 523 U.S. at 81. Courts, however, may be somewhat
more willing to apply the trait equality logic to clothing and grooming
cases outside of the employment context. In Rosa v. Park West Bank &
Trust Co., for example, a bank employee refused to give Lucas Rosa a
loan application because he was wearing a dress. She told him she
would not provide him with a loan application until he changed into
more gender appropriate clothes. 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000). Rosa
sued under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act alleging sex
discrimination. The Court of Appeals in reversing the district court's
dismissal of Rosa's claim held that he had stated a cause of action for sex
discrimination based on failure to satisfy gender stereotypes. In
recognizing Rosa' claim the court explained: "It is reasonable to infer that
[the bank employee] told [Rosa] to go home and change because she
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C.

Problems with the Trait Equality Approach
Despite its rhetorical appeal, the trait equality
approach suffers from two weaknesses as a response to the
question of when sex-specific trait discrimination should be
actionable sex discrimination. As will become clear shortly,
the problems in fact map onto two distinct conceptions of
the trait equality approach. First, because true or pure crosssex trait equality can never exist, a finding of discrimination
under this approach in fact relies on contested and
controversial naming and framing choices. In a gendered
society, women and men simply cannot possess the same
trait in precisely the same way. This fact of substantive trait
inequality undermines the most basic conception of and
justification for the trait equality approach--that like must be
treated alike. It also, however, undermines the seemingly
simple rule-like nature of the approach. Because of the lack
of real cross-sex trait parallels, determining when trait
equality is met or violated becomes in effect an
indeterminate nominalism game whose outcome depends
on how one names the trait at issue and frames the cross sex
comparison. The trait equality approach itself offers no
guidance on these questions.
Second, the trait equality
approach mistakenly equates nondiscrimination with formal
neutrality and the nonenforcement of all gender norms. The
trait equality approach becomes more coherent and useful to
the extent one understands it as grounded not on the idea
that like must be treated alike but instead on the assertion
that differences created by gender norms are illegitimate.
Yet, trait equality’s requirement of rigid gender-blind
neutrality is neither necessary for substantive sex equality
nor otherwise normatively desirable.
1.

The Problem of Indeterminance

thought that [his] attire did not accord with his male gender . . ." Id. at
215-16.
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To the extent that the trait equality approach is based
on the idea that like must be treated alike, the approach is
undermined by the fact that women and men never possess
exactly the same traits in exactly the same way. Given this
fact, findings of discrimination become, in effect, the product
of indeterminate nominalism choices: how does one name
the trait at issue and frame the appropriate (approximate)
cross sex comparison. In this section I will move from
examples in which the problem with cross sex trait
parallelism is clear to those in which the problem is more
subtle in order to highlight the impossibility in all cases of
true trait equality. In addition, I will show, with each set of
examples, how contested nominalism questions determine
findings of discrimination under this approach.
a.

Biological Traits
The impossibility of women and men possessing the
same trait is most apparent in cases in which the trait at
issue is a biological one which simply cannot be possessed
by individuals of the opposite sex. In such cases, true trait
equality and theoretically pure cross sex comparisons are
clearly not possible. Findings of discrimination, therefore,
necessarily depend upon how one frames the (approximate)
cross sex comparison.
Consider first the hypothetical case of an employer
who happily hires both women and men but refuses to hire
women with high-pitched voices. The employer has no
problem hiring or promoting women; the employer simply
finds female high-pitched voices grating and so refuses to
hire women with such voices.
In order to determine whether the adverse treatment
a woman with a high-pitched voice suffers is sex
discrimination, the trait equality approach requires
comparing her treatment to that of a man with the same
trait. Men, though, will not possess the very same trait.
Some men may possess high-pitched male voices but none
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will possess a high-pitched female voice.84 It is not possible,
therefore, to assert the high-voiced woman’s sex
discrimination claim by pointing to the employer’s different
treatment of men with the very same attribute.
Applying the trait equality approach in practice
necessarily requires loosening the comparison. One might,
for example, name the trait for which the woman was fired
as a voice that was unexpectedly or unusually high-pitched
and then compare her treatment to that of men who also had
unexpectedly or unusually high pitched voices. One could,
in other words, try to show that the employer treated
women with high-pitched voices worse than it treated men
with high-pitched voices and violated the (pragmatic)
mandate of trait equality in this way.
It is not at all clear, however, that naming the trait at
issue and framing the cross sex comparison in this way
makes sense. Unusually high-pitched female voices really
are different from unusually high-pitched male voices both
in tone and effect, and it may be that only the former give
the employer a headache.85 De-sexing and re-naming the
Women’s and men’s voices differ not only in pitch but in a number of
other aspects stemming from anatomical differences between them. See
Ronald C. Scherer, A Basic Overview of Voice Production, at
www.voicefoundation.org/VFScherervoiceprod.html (explaining that
“[t]he voices of women and men differ relative to a number of aspects
including larynx size, speaking pitch, pitch range, the space between the
vocal folds, and the incidence of voice problems). Indeed, producing
plausible female voices remains a significant problem for male-to-female
transsexuals. See Kerstin Neumann, et al., Cricothyroidopopexy in Male-to
female-Transsexuals, 6 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF TRANSGENDERISM
(2002), available online at www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtvo06no03_oh.htm,
(explaining that “[t]he secondary sex characteristic of the larynx with its
vocal function remains a major obstacle to male-to-female transsexuals
‘passing’ as female”); Susan D. Clark, To Sound Like a Woman, GENDYS
Conference
1998,
available
online
at
www.gender.org.uk/conf/1998/clark.htm
(providing
therapeutic
techniques to assist male-to-female transsexuals in developing female
voices).
85 To the extent that the employer’s prohibition on high voices can be
characterized as a neutral requirement that workers have voices that are
84
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trait at issue for the woman with the high-pitched voice may
enable a cross sex comparison, but it may also
fundamentally distort the trait for which the woman is
actually being disadvantaged.
Problems stemming from the lack of true cross sex
trait equality have been most obvious and acute in courts’
analysis of sex discrimination claims based on pregnancy.
Pregnancy, like the high-pitched female voice, has no
identical cross sex parallel--men cannot become pregnant.
Under a rigid (yet theoretically pure) application of trait
equality logic, therefore, pregnancy discrimination would
never constitute sex discrimination. Because a pregnant
woman could never show that she was being treated worse
than a man with the (precise) same trait, she could never
show that adverse employment actions related to her
pregnancy discriminated against her on the basis of sex.86
This was the approach the Supreme Court followed,
and the conclusion that it reached, in Geduldig v. Aiello87 and
General Electric v. Gilbert.88
Geduldig involved a 14th
Amendment challenge to a California state disability
insurance program which denied benefits for pregnancy
related needs. The court held that the program did not
below a certain pitch or decibel level, a female plaintiff who is denied
employment as a result might be able to challenge the prohibition as
having a disparate impact on female job applicants. If, however, the
prohibition actually affected only a very small percentage of female job
applicants, the plaintiff might not be able to show a significant groupbased disparity of impact to be actionable.
86 There has been extensive scholarly writing on the proper way to frame
pregnancy for the purposes of antidiscrimination law. See e.g., Herma
Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: The Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY
WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (1985); Reva B. Siegel, Employment Equality Under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929 (1985); Samuel
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating
the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1995); Wendy W.
Williams, Equality’s Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1984-85).
87 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
88 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
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violate the Equal Protection Clause because the program did
not penalize women for possessing a trait which men were
not penalized for possessing. In effect, according to the
court, the program did not discriminate on the basis of sex
because it did not distinguish between pregnant women and
pregnant men. Instead, the program simply distinguished
between “pregnant women and non pregnant persons”89
Two years later, in Gilbert, the Court applied trait
equality logic in the same way. Gilbert involved a Title VII
challenge to an employer’s disability plan which, while
otherwise comprehensive, excluded coverage for disabilities
arising from pregnancy.90 Following Geduldig, the Court
held that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from
coverage did not constitute sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII because the employer was not treating female
employees worse than similarly situated male employees.91
Rather than denying women something that was granted to
men, the plan denied pregnancy related benefits to all
employees regardless of their sex.92 As the Court explained:
“pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk,
unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for
this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the
benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results
from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.”93
Congress responded to Gilbert and Geduldig by
passing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in which it told
courts that the appropriate comparison in pregnancy
discrimination cases was the treatment of pregnant women
and that of non pregnant persons similar in terms of their
“ability or inability to work.”94 In a sense the court renamed

417 U.S. at 496-97.
429 U.S. at 127-31.
91 Id. at 133-36.
92 Id. at 138-39.
93 Id. at 139.
94 The Pregnancy Disability Act was added to Title VII in 1978 and
amended its definitions portion. It provides in relevant part:
89
90
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the trait at issue from pregnancy per se to the more
generalized trait of physical disability and then reframed the
cross sex comparison in terms of this non sex specific trait.
Framing questions in the pregnancy context remain,
however. Circuit courts are divided as to whether the
precise comparison should be to employees similarly
situated in their ability or inability to work regardless of the
source of their injuries or to only those similarly abled
employees suffering from nonoccupational injuries.95
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis
of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs as other persons
not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.
42 U.S.C. §2000e(k). See also Newport News, 462 U.S. at 684 (“The [PDA]
makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat pregnancy–related
conditions less favorably than other medical conditions”).
95 Compare Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that in order to determine whether there is a PDA violation the
treatment of pregnant women should be compared with the treatment of
nonpregnant individuals who are similar in terms of their ability or
inability to work regardless of the place of their injury); with Urbano v.
Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
treatment of pregnant women must be compared with that of similarly
abled nonpregnant workers who were injured off the job); Spivey v.
Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
PDA required that pregnant women be treated the same as other
similarly abled workers who suffered nonoccupational disabilities). See
generally Jamie L. Clanton, Toward Eradicating Pregnancy Discrimination at
Work: Interpreting the PDA to “Mean What it Says,” 86 IOWA L. REV. 703
(2001) (analyzing the disagreement among courts over who is similarly
situated to the pregnant woman under the PDA).
In the race context, challenges to employers’ no facial hair
policies raise similar framing issues. Black men sometimes challenge
such policies because shaving leads to the skin condition
pseudofolliculitis barbae in a significant number of black men while
having no such effect on white men.
See Christine Jolls,
Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 654 (2001).
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b.

Dress, Appearance & Sexual Orientation
The impossibility of true cross sex trait equality is not
limited to a narrow range of cases involving sex-specific
biological traits, nor are the accompanying nominalism
issues so limited. Such problems with the trait equality
approach are also clear in cases involving trait
discrimination based on dress, appearance and sexual
orientation.
Consider first a hypothetical employer who is
generally perfectly willing to hire women but refuses to hire
women who wear sexy clothes to work. There is no exact
male equivalent to the female trait of sexy dressing and
attempts to choose an appropriate cross sex approximation
are puzzling.
One could, for example, name the trait at issue in the
sexy dressing case in a narrowly literalistic way as wearing
Plaintiffs and courts have generally treated such policies as race neutral
ones. They have framed the trait at issue as having facial hair and
concluded that the policies treat black men and white men the same with
respect to this trait. Whether the policies resulted in an illegal disparate
impact on black men rather than whether they were an illegal form of
disparate treatment discrimination has generally been the issue in these
cases. See e.g., EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980)
(upholding no-beard policy against disparate impact challenge because
plaintiff in that case could not show actual disparate impact against
black men resulting from policy); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, 7 F.3d 795
(8th Cir. 1993) (striking down no-beard policy in response to a disparate
impact challenge because employer could not show the policy was
justified by business necessity); Richardson v. Quik Trip Corp., 591 F. Supp.
1151 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (striking down no-beard policy because of its
disparate impact on black men); EEOC v. Trailways, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 54
(D. Colo. 1981) (same); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.
1993) (ruling for employer on disparate impact challenge to no-beard
policy on grounds that policy was justified by business necessity). One
could, however, frame the trait at issue in these cases not as the presence
of facial hair but as the proclivity for skin disease. Because a no facial
hair policy requires black men, but not white men, to take steps to cause
themselves skin disease, the policy looks like a form of race-specific trait
discrimination when framed in this way.
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particular types of clothes, i.e. low cut blouses and tight
skirts. Naming the trait at issue in this way, the woman is
the victim of sex discrimination if she is being treated worse
than a man who wore the same types of blouses and skirts to
work. She is not the victim of sex discrimination if she is not
being treated worse than a man who wore the same clothes.
Framing the issue in this way is unlikely to result in a
finding of sex discrimination.
It is far from clear, however, that this narrowly
literalistic framing of the cross sex comparison is
appropriate. The proper comparator for the sexy dressed
woman may not be a man dressed in the very same clothing.
A man dressed in a low cut blouse and tight skirt might be
objectionable to the employer but it is probably not because
he is sexy. If the employer is really objecting to a female
employee exuding sexuality at work, it arguably does not
bolster or refute this woman’s claim of sex discrimination
under the trait equality approach to show that the employer
also objects to hiring men in drag. Sexy dressed women and
men in drag arguably do not possess the same (or even a
close approximation of the same) trait.96
Consider similarly a woman and man who both wear high healed
shoes to work. What it means, to wear high heels as a woman is very
different from what it means to wear high heels as a man. Wearing high
heels as a woman fits into a particular pattern of decoration-focused
traits and attributes commonly and acceptably associated with women.
High-heel wearing has meaning for women—it is associated with
sexiness, dressiness, and physical display—and it is a meaning stemming
from the trait’s comfortable place within a set of gender appropriate
behavior. What it means to wear high heels as a man is entirely
different. High-heel wearing is not part of a set of gender appropriate
behavior for men. As a result, high-heel wearing for men is commonly
perceived as neither sexy nor dressy but simply deviant and strange. In
Oiler v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., the district court saw a man dressing
as a woman as not only dissimilar from a woman dressing as a woman
but indeed as disordered. According to the court, “this is not a situation
where the plaintiff failed to conform to a gender stereotype. Plaintiff
was not discharged because he did not act sufficiently masculine or
because he exhibited traits normally valued in a female employee, but
disparaged in a male employee. . . . The plaintiff was terminated

96

39

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

Alternatively then, one could instead frame the cross
sex comparison by looking at the way the employer treats
men dressed in sex-specific sexy clothing. Of course,
deciding what constitutes sexy dressing for men is itself not
obvious and probably open to disagreement.97 Is the parallel
to the sexy dressing woman in revealing short skirts and low
cut blouses a man in revealing open-chested shirts and tight
pants. Or, because of the significantly different social and
symbolic meanings of women and men in revealing
clothing, are tight and revealing clothes considered sexy in
women but strange, inappropriate and nonsexy in men such
that this too may not be an appropriate comparison?
Finally, one could instead compare the employer’s
treatment of sexy dressing women with its treatment of men
who violate appropriate workplace norms. At this level of
abstraction, however, the trait equality approach becomes
toothless and unable to challenge employers’ endorsement
of any gender stereotypes. The problem is not only that
there is no exact cross sex trait parallel but that there is no
good, and certainly no uncontroversial, approximation.
Naming and framing issues of this sort dominated the
court’s analysis in the sex discrimination case of Craft v.
Metromedia.98 Christine Craft was hired as a TV co-anchor
by a television station in Kansas City, Missouri.
Immediately after she began the job, the station began
having concerns about Craft’s appearance. Public opinion
surveys performed by a media consultant company hired by
the television station found that viewers had an
“overwhelmingly
negative”
response
to
Craft’s
because he is a man with gender identity disorder who, in order to
publicly disguise himself as a woman, wears women’s clothing, shoes,
underwear, breast prostheses, wigs, make-up, and nail polish, pretends
to be a woman, and publicly identifies himself as a woman named
‘Donna.’” See Oiler, 2002 WL 31098541 at *5.
97 I suspect there is significantly less social consensus regarding what
constitutes sexy dressing for men than there is about what constitutes
sexy dressing for women.
98 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985).
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appearance.99 After continually poor survey results, the
station reassigned Craft from co-anchor to reporter. Craft
refused to accept the assignment and sued for sex
discrimination.100 Craft argued that she was discriminated
against because she was held to more stringent appearance
standards than were male newscasters. The district court
ruled in favor of Metromedia on Craft’s Title VII sex
discrimination claim and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
As with the previous examples, it is not clear how to
analyze Craft’s discrimination claim under the trait equality
approach. It is not clear how to characterize the trait for
which Craft was fired nor how to identify appropriate male
employees with whom to compare her treatment. Was Craft
demoted for possessing particular/precise traits (e.g., having
short hair, wearing oxford shirts) such that her treatment
should be compared to that of male newscasters possessing
the same traits? Interpreting the trait for which Craft was
demoted in this narrow way does not, however, well capture
what the station actually found problematic about Craft’s
appearance. The station was clearly concerned with Craft
having an overall appearance that was pleasing and
attractive to viewers. It was not committed to or concerned
about Craft having any particular aesthetic attributes.
Indeed, judging from the many different people hired by the
station to advise Craft about her wardrobe and appearance,
it appears that the station did not have a clear idea about
what physical and clothing attributes would please
mercurial viewer tastes. Alternatively, was Craft demoted
for having an overall appearance that was unattractive to
viewers such that her treatment should be compared to that
of male newscasters whose appearance was also unattractive
to viewers? This was essentially the comparison that both
the district and the circuit courts made.101 Again though,
Id. at 1209.
Id. at 1209.
101 The district court concluded: "defendant's standards of appearance for
its on-air personnel can in no way be considered discriminatory per se.
99

100
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applying the trait equality rationale at this high level of
abstraction simply reifies socially gendered conceptions of
beauty and fails to find discrimination any time an employer
consistently enforces sex specific gender norms.
In fact, Craft did not object to her being held to a
different gender specific standard of grooming and
appearance. She simply argued that these standards were
more stringent and more strictly enforced for women than
for men.102 However, once one accepts the legitimacy or
Both men and women were required to maintain a professional,
business-like appearance consistent with community standards." Craft v.
Metromedia, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Mo. 1983). The court of
appeals agreed that the station's enforcement of socially gendered
appearance standards on its newscasters was consistent and non
discriminatory. According to the court:
While there may have been some emphasis on the
feminine stereotype of 'softness' and bows and ruffles
and on the fashionableness of female anchors, the
evidence suggests such concerns were incidental to a
true focus on consistency of appearance, proper
coordination of colors and textures, the effects of studio
lighting on clothing and makeup, and the greater degree
of conservatism thought necessary in the Kansas City
market. The 'dos' and 'don'ts' for female anchors
addressed the need to avoid, for example, tight sweaters
or overly 'sexy' clothing and extreme 'high fashion' or
'sporty' outfits while the male 'dos' and 'don'ts' similarly
cautioned against 'frivolous' colors and 'extreme'
textures and styles as damaging to the 'authority' of
newscasters. These criteria do not implicate the primary
thrust of Title VII, which is to prompt employers to
'discard outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct
employment disadvantage for one sex.'
Craft, 766 F.2d at 1215 (citations omitted).
102 Craft and supporting amici curiae argued both that the television
station enforced appearance standards more strictly on female than male
on-air personnel and that the socially gendered appearance standards
themselves were discriminatory. Craft, 766 F.2d at 1212-1214. Craft
presented evidence showing that "only females were subject to daily
scrutiny of their appearance or were ever required to change clothes at
the station before going on the air and that no male was ever directed to
take time from his journalistic duties to select clothing, with the help of a
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necessity of sex-specific appearance scales, there is no way to
identify a good opposite-sex parallel to Craft's level of
attractiveness so as to determine whether men with similar
levels of attractiveness were treated differently.
Related nominalism issues arise in cases involving
discrimination based on sexual orientation. When a woman
is discriminated against for engaging in a sexual relationship
with a woman it is significant, and often outcome
determinative under trait equality logic, how one names the
trait for which she is being adversely treated. There is no
trait that a man can possess that is exactly the same as the
one the woman is being fired for. Having sex with a woman
as a man is different from having sex with a woman as a
woman, and having sex with someone of the same sex as a
man is different than having sex with someone of the same
sex as a woman. There is no exact opposite sex trait parallel
for the woman having sex with a woman.
Findings of discrimination under the trait equality
approach again descend to the level of nominalism. If one
names the trait at issue as having sex with women, then the
appropriate opposite sex parallel would be a man who has
sex with women. If the woman who has sex with women is
treated adversely while the man who has sex with women is
not, then the trait equality requirement has been violated
and sex discrimination exists. If, however, one names the
trait at issue as engaging in same-sex or homosexual sexual
relations, then the opposite sex parallel would be a man who
also engages in same sex or homosexual sexual relations. If
the woman is not being treated worse than a man who also
engages in same-sex sexual relations then the trait equality
consultant, from Macy's and to test that clothing on camera for the
approval of another consultant." Id. at 1212-1213. In addition, Craft, but
seemingly no one else at the station, was eventually required to use a
clothing calendar. According to the court of appeals, "[t]he 'clothing
calendar' was a calendar given to Craft showing in detail for each day
the blazer, blouse, and skirt (or occasionally slacks) she was to wear. A
note in one corner indicated that the appropriate accessory would be
either a single strand of pearls or a single gold chain." Id. at 1209 n. 2.
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requirement has not been violated and sex discrimination
does not exist. How one names the initial trait at issue is
conceptually ambiguous, politically loaded, and outcome
determinative under the trait equality approach to trait
discrimination.103

103 Certainly there has been a great deal of scholarly writing regarding
why one type of framing is better than the alternatives. See e.g., Edward
Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay
Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471 (2001) (highlighting the weaknesses of the
argument that discrimination based on sexual orientation is a form of sex
discrimination); Andrew Koppelman, Defending The Sex Discrimination
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 519 (arguing in favor of treating discrimination based on sexual
orientation as a form of sex discrimination). See also David S. Schwartz,
When is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1773-74 (2002) ("Embracing a sexstereotyping theory in a same-sex harassment case would be tantamount
to extending Title VII harassment protection to lesbians, gays, and
gender nonconformists. Such discrimination is inevitably based on the
perception that the target of the discrimination has failed to adopt
behavior—gender or sexual behavior—deemed suitable to his or her sex,
and is therefore discrimination 'because of . . . sex' under a plain
language reading of Title VII"); Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes,
and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation of ‘Sex,’ ‘Gender,’ and ‘Sexual
Orientation’ in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1, 125-26
(1995) ("[W]hile sex and gender discrimination are formally illegal and
sexual orientation discrimination is not, it is impossible (by conflationary
definition) to practice 'sexual orientation' discrimination without also
and simultaneously committing sex and gender discrimination");
Catharine A. MacKinnon for National Organization on Male Sexual
Victimization, et al., United States Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Oncale
v. Sundowner Services, in support of Oncale, 1997 WL 471814 *28 ("When
individuals are sexually harassed because of the sex of their sexual
partners, real or imagined, they are harassed because of sex. First,
formally speaking, those harassed because they are gay men or lesbian
women are harassed because of the gender of their sexual partners and
identification. If their own gender, or that of their loved ones, were
different, they would not be so treated'); Stephen Clark, Same-Sex But
Equal: Reformulating the Miscegenation Analogy, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 107, 12038 2002) (discussing and analyzing the different ways to conceptualize
discrimination based on one’s involvement in a same-sex sexual
relationship);ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND
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c.

Character Traits
The indeterminacy of the trait equality approach is
not limited to exceptional cases. In somewhat more subtle
ways the impossibility of cross sex trait parallelism and the
naming and framing problems that stem from it are
systematic and undermine the approach’s usefulness in all
cases, not only the more obvious ones discussed above.
In a sexist society nothing done by men and women
will have precisely the same meaning. Traits are not
understood or viewed as isolated technical attributes. They
are necessarily viewed in relation to all the other traits an
individual possesses and through a systematically gendered
lens.
Traits such as competitiveness or active leadership,
for example, are perceived very differently when possessed
by women or men.
Consider one study in which
participants were told to evaluate job candidates for a
computer lab manager position at a university. Participants
viewed videotapes and read “life philosophy” essays from
female and male candidates. Researchers found that female
candidates with essays that emphasized “agentic” qualities
such as competitiveness were rated “less socially skilled and
likeable than an identically presented man.”104 Another
study found that the same leadership activities of women
and men resulted in very different affective responses from
those dealing with them. Women engaging in group
leadership activities received more displeased responses and
fewer pleased responses from group members than did men
SOCIAL EQUALITY 154-58 (1996) (using trait equality logic to argue that
sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination).
104 Laurie A. Rudman & Peter Glick, Prescriptive Gender Stereotypes and
Backlash Toward Agentic Women, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 743, 747 (2001). The
study involved as participants 172 (105 women, and 67 men)
undergraduates at Rutgers University.
The participants viewed
videotapes and read “life philosophy” essays from women and men
whom they were told were candidates for a computer lab manager
position at the university.

45

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

engaging in the same behavior and making the same
suggestions and arguments.105 Therefore, even when
technical trait symmetries are possible (in the sense that
women and men can physically do precisely the same thing),
traits will mean very different things when possessed by a
woman or by a man.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins provides a good example.
It is simply not the case that Hopkins was fired for engaging
in or exhibiting the same traits that men engaged in and
exhibited. Social meanings are real. Aggressiveness in
women is bitchy in a way aggressiveness in men is not.
Competitiveness in women is threatening in a way that
competitiveness in men is not. Vulgarity in women is
shocking and disturbing in a way that vulgarity in men is
not. Even if Ann Hopkins had engaged in technically
identical behavior to that of her male colleagues, her
behavior would not have been socially the same.
Determining whether Hopkins was the victim of sex
See D. Butler, & F.L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female
Leaders: Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 48 (1990). The study involved 168 student
participants (84 women and 84 men). Participants took part in small
discussion groups composed of one male and one female participant and
one male and one female confederate who were trained by the
researchers to perform the role of group leader in a standardized
manner. The study used two leader scripts, A and B, in all discussions.
In half the sessions the male leader used script A and the female leader
used script B, and in the other sessions it was reversed. Coders sat in an
adjacent room behind one way mirrors and tallied participants’ non
verbal affect expressions. Coders tallied nonverbal cues of pleasure such
as smiling or nodding in agreement and coded nonverbal cues of
displeasure such as a furrowed brow, tightening of the mouth or nods of
disagreement. In addition to controlling what the female and male
leaders actually said, the researches monitored the male and female
leaders to make sure that they did not differ in eye contact, gaze
direction, body posture or amount of body movement. See also Eagly,
A.H., Makhjani, M.G. & Klonsky, B.G., Gender and the Evaluation of
Leaders: A Meta-Analysis, 111 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 3 (1992) (finding
that women managers with a direct task-oriented leadership style are
evaluated more negatively than men with similar management styles).
105
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discrimination under the trait equality approach again
depends on how one chooses to name the behavior for
which she was fired and frame the (approximate) cross sex
comparison.
To point out that women and men can never possess
precisely the same traits in precisely the same way is not to
argue that employers are therefore justified in treating
women and men differently. Recognizing the gendered
meanings of traits is important, though, because it highlights
that to the extent that women and men should be treated the
same it is not because they are in fact precisely the same but
in spite of the fact that they are not. It was appropriate, for
example, for Title VII to prohibit law firms from refusing to
hire female lawyers because clients objected to working with
them. But this was not because female lawyers really
were/are just like male lawyers. Instead, it was because
eradicating the gender norms that made female lawyers
seem strange, incompetent, or offensive was essential to Title
VII’s sex equality mission.
This recognition then also suggests a second possible
conception of and justification for the trait equality approach
to sex discrimination. Perhaps the real intuition underlying
and driving the trait equality approach is not that aggressive
women or men in dresses must be treated the same as
aggressive men or women in dresses because they are in fact
the same, but that they cannot be treated differently because
of gender norms.
In other words, the vision of
nondiscrimination underlying the trait equality approach
may not be based on a claim of sameness but instead on a
claim of the illegitimacy of certain kinds of differences. The
trait equality approach viewed in this way requires willful
blindness to social meanings about gender and defines
nondiscrimination as the elimination, or at least the
nonenforcement, of gender norms by employers.
In the following section, I will show that this second
conception of trait equality, while certainly more coherent at
explaining why aggressive women should be treated like
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aggressive men and men in dresses should be treated like
women in dresses, is no better at justifying trait equality as
the appropriate response to sex-specific trait discrimination
under Title VII. Title VII’s nondiscrimination mandate does
not require the rigid neutrality and blindness to gender
norms called for by the trait equality approach. Moreover,
the approach, while not necessary for substantive equality, is
likely to be costly in terms of employee and employer
liberty.
2.

The Problem of Neutrality
An alternative way to understand the trait equality
approach is as an argument against gender norms.
Nondiscrimination requires rigid neutrality toward women
and men engaged in technically similar behavior not because
the behavior really looks the same, but because the reason it
looks different is illegitimate. The approach conceived of in
this way views gender norms as illegitimate and the
nonenforcement of them as a core component of Title VII’s
nondiscrimination goal.
Although the trait equality
requirement of rigid sex neutrality becomes more coherent
as a result of this anti-norms argument, it becomes no more
convincing as an interpretation of Title VII. In this section I
argue that rigid neutrality is neither required by Title VII nor
otherwise normatively appealing. I show that sex neutral
rules themselves do not always look nondiscriminatory, and,
more importantly, nonneutral rules are not always
discriminatory. Rigid neutrality and elimination of gender,
is not necessary to end sex hierarchy in the workplace and is
not, therefore, required by Title VII. Moreover, equating
nondiscrimination with rigid neutrality is likely to
encourage an androgyny in the workplace that, while being
unnecessary for equality, has serious costs for individual
liberty.
What nondiscrimination means in the context of
employment may actually be significantly more complex
than the formal sex neutrality called for by the trait equality
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approach. To highlight the intuitive disconnect between
neutrality and nondiscrimination consider three scenarios
and how they play out under the trait equality approach.
a.
The Aggressive Woman. As the Hopkins case illustrated,
aggressive women are viewed differently and more
negatively than are aggressive men. Aggressive men are
likely to be perceived as authoritative and competent while
aggressive women are likely to be perceived as bitchy, shrill,
and overbearing. A woman who is terminated or denied
promotion for engaging in the same aggressive behavior that
male co-workers engage in without adverse effect might
argue that trait equality requires that she be treated the same
as similarly behaving men despite the different social
meanings attached to the behavior for women and men.
b.
The Cross-dressing Man. Men in traditionally female
clothing and make-up are viewed more negatively than are
women in the same attire. Women wearing traditionally
female clothes are viewed as social conformists, while men
wearing women’s clothes are viewed as gender
nonconformists and, sometimes, as social deviants. A man
denied employment or terminated from employment
because of his cross-dressing might rely on the trait equality
approach to argue that he cannot be penalized for engaging
in the same behavior—e.g. wearing skirts, high heels, and
make-up—which female employees engage in without
adverse action.
c.
The Buzz Cut Woman. A buzz haircut on a woman has
significantly different meaning than a buzz haircut on a
man. Shannon Faulkner made this point when she fought to
gain admittance to The Citadel without also being forced to
get the “knob” haircut traditional to male cadets. As
Faulkner argued, while the meaning of the buzz cut on a
man is an acceptable masculinity, the meaning of the buzz
cut on a woman is an unacceptable and strange masculinity
at odds with appropriate gender norms. On a woman, a
buzz cut would signal not straight-laced hyper-masculinity
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but socially and sexually deviant “outlaw” status.106 The
Citadel responded by invoking the logic of trait equality.
The Citadel argued that if nondiscrimination means treating
women and men the same regardless of the different social
meanings attached to particular traits, then they could not be
engaging in sex discrimination by treating Faulkner the way
they would treat any incoming male cadet who refused to
get the knob haircut.107
From the perspective of the trait equality approach, it
is hard to distinguish among these cases. The trait equality
approach, at least when applied in the way its advocates
encourage, seems to protect the aggressive woman, the
cross-dressing man and The Citadel. One might believe,
however, that as a substantive matter rejecting gender norms
and acting neutrally in the context of The Citadel hindered
rather than encouraged sex equality. 108
This was the argument made by Faulkner and The
Department of Justice. Faulkner’s lawyer argued that “[t]he
principle of formal equality . . . ignored the social meaning
of the haircut, a code for masculinity that marks a cadet as
male. . . . Stripped of her hair, Shannon would be doubly
excluded: she would not look like a male cadet, but neither
would she look like a real woman. She would be a gender
outlaw—neither male nor female. Doubtless many male
See Valerie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in
Traditionally Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 68, 70-71 (2002).
See also Center for Military Readiness, et al. United States Supreme Court
Brief in U.S. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, in support of Commonwealth of
Virginia. 1995 WL 744997 at *14 (describing the Department of Justice
arguments to the district court that a buzz haircut simply did not fit into
the range of traits and attributes deemed socially acceptable for women).
107 See Vojdik, supra note __ at 70-71 (noting The Citadel argument that
equal treatment “meant the same treatment afforded male cadets”).
108 Imposing trait equality on Faulkner in this case would probably seem
discriminatory even if the requirement were not so clearly being used by
the Citadel as simply a pretext for her exclusion. See Vojdik, supra note
__ (describing the violence and desperation with which The Citadel tried
to exclude Faulkner).
106
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cadets would label her a ‘dyke,’ a butch lesbian whose
sexual desire for women makes her not a ‘real woman.’”109
Similarly, the Department of Justice argued that The Citadel
“’was proceeding under the guise of gender-neutral
grooming policies [that] implement rules which altogether
denigrate Ms. Faulkner’s identity as a woman.’”110 The
district court rejected these norm-based arguments and
adopted instead the equation of nondiscrimination with
formal trait equality when it refused to enjoin The Citadel
from requiring Faulkner to get the knob haircut.111 As the
district court essentially asked, if neutrality is the
appropriate definition of nondiscrimination then how can it
be discrimination to impose a sex-neutral trait requirement?
One might of course argue that it is one thing to
require sex neutrality when it is being sought by a plaintiff
who wants to possess a gender atypical trait, but it is
something quite distinct to allow employers to impose a sexneutral (but gender bending) requirement on an unwilling
plaintiff who does not want to challenge traditional gender
norms. It is a different thing, in other words, to say The
Citadel must permit Faulkner to get a knob haircut if she
had wanted one, than to say that The Citadel may require
Faulkner to get a knob haircut even if she does not want
one.112 This distinction is certainly meaningful. It suggests,

Vojdik, supra note __ at 71.
Center for Military Readiness Amicus Brief, supra note __ at *14
(source of quotation omitted from original). One could likewise imagine
an employer that refused to hire anyone with hair longer than onequarter inch in length. The employer would argue that its policy did not
violate the trait equality requirement while women challenging the
policy would argue that nondiscrimination required something other
than trait equality.
111 Vojdik, supra note __ at 71.
112 Imagine that Faulkner had wanted to get a knob haircut and The
Citadel had tried to stop her by arguing that on women the haircut
signified a strange outlaw status that was not in keeping with the
mission and message of The Citadel. In this scenario, arguments about
the social meaning of hair probably seem less persuasive and
109
110
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however, that what it means to not discriminate on the basis
of sex may in fact be significantly more complicated than a
simple requirement of employer neutrality.
Trait equality advocates might respond by arguing
that although for them nondiscrimination always requires
sex-neutral requirements, not every neutrally imposed
requirement will be acceptable, some will be impermissibly
burdensome or unfairly costly for individuals of one sex or
the other.113 Neutrality, they might argue, is in a sense a
necessary but not sufficient condition for nondiscrimination.
Even this claim is too strong, however. Neutrality
and the nonenforcement of gender norms are not always
necessary for nondiscrimination, and nonneutrality does not
always constitute sex discrimination.
Certainly, many
gender norms—such as that equating female aggressiveness
with bitchiness—are incompatible with women’s full,
effective participation in the work world. All gender norms,
however, are not created equal. Employers may recognize
some norms without impeding sex equality in the
workplace. An employer may, for example, require male
employees to have hair no longer than the top of their collars
while imposing no such requirement on female employees.
The gender norm at issue—that serious, professional men
have short hair--does not reinforce messages of male
dominance or of female weakness, sexual availability or
incompetence. Enforcing the norm that men should have
short hair does not limit the range of job possibilities
available to men or diminish their perceived competence for
such jobs. Permitting women a wider range of acceptable
hairstyles enables them to mimic a professional male
hairstyle or choose a more traditionally feminine style.
Similarly an employer may permit women to wear skirts
without permitting men to do so. Again, men are not
arguments in favor of trait equality more persuasive than they did in
the actual case.
113 Such is, of course, the insight of the disparate impact doctrine of Title
VII.
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disadvantaged in the work world by being forced to mimic
the clothing style of the ideal male worker, and women, too,
are not harmed by being given the choice of mimicking the
ideal male clothing style or choosing a more traditionally
feminine style. Allowing employers to act on the gender
norm making men in dresses seem deviant does not impede
the ability of men (or women) to participate fully and
effectively in the work world. Certainly, some men will feel
constrained by the previous sex-specific trait requirements,
but the requirements themselves do not inhibit the
substantive sex equality that is Title VII’s goal. Moreover, as
a practical matter, it is unlikely that gender-bending men
will be less constrained under a pure trait equality regime
than under one allowing for limited instances of sex-specific
workplace rules.
One possible result of the trait equality approach, the
one advocates like Case and Taylor hope for, is that
employers will expand the range of permissible traits and
attributes open to employees of both sexes allowing both
women and men to gender bend or not gender bend
depending on their own preferences. An employer might,
for example, have a grooming code that allowed for two
possible haircuts. One shoulder-length bob generally more
appealing to women, and one crew cut generally more
appealing to men. Both women and men would, however,
be able to choose either cut.
This is not, however, the only, or perhaps even the
most likely, response to the trait equality requirement. If
employers are uncomfortable with gender bending
behavior—either because of their own sensibilities or
because they think it will offend their customers—they may
choose instead to narrow the range of trait options available
to their employees to only those that the employer will find
acceptable when possessed by either sex.114 The options, in
This is a possibility that Case herself clearly recognizes. See Case,
supra note __ at 8. Another alternative would be for employers to
increase their pre-employment screening measures so as to exclude
114

53

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

other words, will converge toward an androgynous mean.
The employer who does not want to employ men in bob
haircuts will simply not make this an option under its dress
code, even if it does not mind women wearing them. The
result is not more options for men to gender bend but fewer
traditionally gender conforming options for women.
Such androgynous workplace rules are, moreover,
unlikely to be sex neutral in their costs. Even assuming, as I
have above, that trait equality advocates would limit the
kind of neutral requirements that employers could impose
so as to prohibit trait requirements that would make public
participation disproportionately costly for individuals of one
sex or the other, there is in fact no dress, grooming, or trait
requirement that does not burden individuals of one sex
more than the other. There really is no single hairstyle that
looks equally good and is equally socially acceptable on
women and men. Short hairstyles for women tend to be
significantly more layered and styled than short hairstyles
on men. Clothing styles may appear relatively androgynous
but even there if we were really to put women and men in
exactly the same clothes with exactly the same cuts one sex
or the other would look a bit weird. The dark blue pants suit
women wear is really not exactly the same as the dark blue
pants suit that men wear. It is generally cut more narrowly
in the jacket, and paired with pants that are narrower at the
waist and fuller at the hips. Sex neutral requirements will,
therefore, almost never be sex neutral in their costs.
This push in the name of antidiscrimination toward
androgyny also leads to a sub pareto optimal outcome in the
sense that some women and men would be made better off
and none would be made worse off if the employer were
applicants with a propensity to gender bend. In this way, employers
could maintain more expansive clothing and grooming options for their
employees while ensuring that the individuals they hire will not in fact
engage in gender bending behavior. Under this approach, individuals
with a desire to gender bend will not be formally prevented from doing
so, they simply will not be hired. I thank Max Schanzenbach for
emphasizing this point to me.

54

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

permitted to institute some sex-specific rules. Both women
and men would then be permitted to engage in certain types
of gender normative behavior. Certainly cross-dressing men
would not be better off under limited sex-specific
employment rules permitting women but not men to wear
dresses, but nor are they terribly well off under rules
requiring androgynous dress from everyone. Equating
nondiscrimination with strict neutrality is likely to diminish
the freedom of everyone while increasing that of no one.
The costs to liberty are high, and they are neither required
nor justified by Title VII’s mandate of equality.
In sum, the trait equality approach to trait
discrimination is initially appealing because of its formal
equality ring and its seeming structural simplicity. Upon
closer scrutiny, however, trait equality proves to be neither
simple to understand nor easy to defend. To the extent it is
based on the premise that like must be treated alike, the
approach collapses into a controversial and indeterminate
naming game. To the extent it is based not on the premise of
sameness but on the illegitimacy of certain types of
difference, the approach mistakenly and needlessly equates
the existence of gender norms with sex inequality. This
equation and its requirement of formal neutrality is likely to
cost us all much, it is likely to gain gender benders little, and
it is unnecessary for the substantive sex equality Title VII
requires. In the following sections, therefore, I search for a
better response to the question of when sex-specific trait
discrimination is actionable sex discrimination.
III.

Trait-Focused Approaches
This section considers two narrower approaches to
the problem of sex-specific trait discrimination, both of
which focus on the nature of the particular trait that is at
issue.
The first approach makes sex-specific trait
discrimination actionable only when the trait is an
immutable characteristic or a fundamental right. The second
approach makes trait discrimination actionable when the
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trait is integral to one’s gender identity. Both approaches
would find actionable significantly less conduct than is
currently prohibited by courts.
A.

Immutable Traits/Fundamental Rights
Eighteen years before the Supreme Court articulated
its sex stereotyping/trait equality rationale in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, it offered a very similar rationale in
the case of Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corporation.115 Martin
Marietta involved a challenge to the company’s policy of
refusing to accept job applications from women with preschool age children while at the same time hiring men with
pre-school age children.116 Martin Marietta was a clear case
of sex-specific trait discrimination. The company did not bar
women as a general matter from employment, and indeed
regularly hired women. 117 The company simply refused to
hire women, and only women, with young children.
The Supreme Court held that Martin Marietta’s hiring
policy would constitute impermissible sex discrimination in
violation Title VII unless the company could show that such
discrimination was permissible under Title VII’s bona fide
occupational qualification exception.118 The Court held that
it was a violation of Title VII for an employer to have
different hiring criteria for women and men and to refuse to
hire women for possessing traits and attributes which were
not disqualifying when possessed by men.119 According to
400 U.S. 542 (1972).
Id. at 543.
117
In fact, at the time Phillips applied for the position of assembly
trainee, 70-75% of the applicants for the position were women and 7580% of those hired for the position were women. Id.
118 Id. at 544. The court explained that “[t]he existence of . . . conflicting
family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for
a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under
§703(e) of the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that
the condition in question ‘is a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business
or enterprise.’” Id.
119 Id.
115
116
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the Court, “Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
requires that persons of like qualifications be given
employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The
Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section as
permitting one hiring policy for women and another for
men—each having pre-school-age children.”120
Subsequently, some courts simply followed the plain
language of the Supreme Court’s decision in Martin Marietta
interpreting it as prohibiting any and all sex-specific trait
requirements and requiring the kind of formal neutrality of
the trait equality approach.121 More commonly, however,
courts interpreted Martin Marietta narrowly as prohibiting

Id. The discrimination made actionable in Martin Marietta often came
to be called “sex-plus” discrimination. The term was coined by the Fifth
Circuit’s Chief Judge Brown in his dissent to the Fifth Circuit’s decision
not to rehear the Martin Marietta case. Brown argued against the appeals
court panel’s decision allowing the employer to engage in sex-based trait
discrimination contending that “[i]f ‘sex-plus’ stands, [Title VII] is dead.”
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown
dissent). See generally, Regina E. Gray, The Rise and Fall of the ‘Sex-Plus’
Discrimination Theory: An Analysis of Fisher v. Vassar College, 42 HOW. L.J.
71 n.34 (1998); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of
Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 371 n. 101 (2001).
121 In a sense, some courts interpreted Martin Marietta as requiring the
trait equality discussed in the last section. See e.g., Sprogis v. United Air
Lines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971) (relying on Martin Marietta to
hold that a no marriage rule applied to female but not male flight
attendants violates Title VII because “in forbidding employers to
discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended
to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes”); Aros v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661, 664 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (holding that a dress and
grooming code constitutes sex discrimination when applied differently
to women and men); Donohue v. Shoe Corp. of America, 337 F. Supp. 1357
(C.D. Cal. 1972) (requiring short hair on men but not on women violates
Title VII); Roberts v. General Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971)
(allowing female employees to wear hairnets but requiring men to wear
hats—and therefore keep their hair short—violates Title VII).
120
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only sex-specific trait discrimination based on immutable
characteristics or fundamental rights.122
The Fifth Circuit most clearly articulated this
narrower approach in the case of Willingham v. Macon
Telegraph Publishing Company.123 Willingham involved a
challenge brought by a male job applicant who was denied
employment because his long hair violated the company’s
grooming code. The company refused to hire men with long
hair but not women with long hair.124 In affirming the
district court’s judgment in favor of the employer, and
upholding the company’s grooming code, the court
explained that “a line must be drawn between distinctions
grounded on fundamental rights . . . and those interfering
with the manner in which an employer exercises his
judgment as to the way to operate a business.”125 The court
held that while Title VII protected against sex-specific trait
discrimination which targeted traits that were particularly
important—namely
immutable
characteristics
and
fundamental rights—Title VII did not protect all trait-based
discrimination whereby an employer chose to single out a
particular subset of women or men for adverse treatment.
The court explained:
Equal employment opportunity may be
secured only when employers are barred from
See generally Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers who are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003) (noting that the ‘plus’ in “sex-plus’ cases
must be “either a fundamental right, such as having children or
marrying, or an immutable physical characteristic”); Gray, supra note __
at 84 (“The requirement that the ‘plus’ in a ‘sex-plus’ case consist of an
‘immutable characteristic’ or a ‘fundamental right’ was established in
cases challenging employers’ grooming/dress code regulations”);
Kessler, supra note __ at 392 (“Courts have found that sex-plus
discrimination is a violation of Title VII only if the ‘plus,’ or facially
neutral characteristic, is either a fundamental right or an immutable
physical characteristic”).
123 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
124 Id. at 1087-88.
125 Id. at 1091.
122
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discriminating against employees on the basis
of immutable characteristics, such as race and
national origin. Similarly, an employer cannot
have one hiring policy for men and another for
women if the distinction is based on some
fundamental right. But a hiring policy that
distinguishes on some other ground, such as
grooming codes or length of hair, is related
more closely to the employer’s choice of how
to run his business than to equality of
opportunity.126
The immutable characteristic/fundamental right
limitation on actionable trait discrimination avoids some of
the conceptual and normative difficulties of the trait equality
approach. The approach, however, is radically under
inclusive in the types of trait discrimination it would treat as
actionable.
A narrow focus on trait discrimination based on
immutable characteristics or fundamental rights, would, for
example have denied protection to Ann Hopkins, and other
women who suffer adverse job consequences because they
are aggressive.127 Aggressiveness is not an immutable
126 Id. at 1091. The court continued to explain: “Private employers are
prohibited from using different hiring policies for men and women only
when the distinctions used relate to immutable characteristics or legally
protected rights. While of course not impervious to judicial scrutiny,
even those distinctions do not violate Sec. 703(a) if they are applied to
both sexes.” Id. at 1092-93. Other courts followed a similar post-Martin
Marietta approach. See generally Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481
F.2d 1115, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that discrimination based on
immutable sex-based characteristics is prohibited but an employee “may
be required to conform to reasonable grooming standards designed to
further the employing company’s interest”); Jarell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that employer’s sex-specific weight
requirements did not violate Title VII because weight is not an
immutable characteristic).
127 This approach would also find non actionable discrimination against
effeminate men. See e.g., Smith v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th
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characteristic. Someone who is predisposed to be aggressive
and competitive can train herself to be more docile and
cooperative. Being aggressive is also clearly not a protected
fundamental right.128
As a result, under the
integral/fundamental trait approach, an employer would be
free to single out aggressive women for adverse
employment treatment. An employer would not violate
Title VII by hiring women generally but simply refusing to
hire aggressive women. Of course, as the Supreme Court
itself recognized in Price Waterhouse, failure to protect
aggressive women from discrimination under Title VII puts
all women in something of a catch-22. They can be refused
employment because they are aggressive and then refused
career advancement because they are not. Allowing trait
discrimination aimed at aggressive women effectively
undermines the ability of all women to compete in the
workplace against men by denying them a characteristic that
is often needed to succeed. Such a narrow approach to traitbased discrimination simply cannot be consistent with Title
VII’s goal of ensuring that women and men will compete in
the work world on equal footing.129
B.

Group-Identity Traits
A different approach would be to make sex-specific
trait discrimination actionable only when the trait for which
certain women (or men) are singled out is one that is integral
to their gender-group identity. The focus of this approach is

Cir. 1978) (relying on Willingham v. Macon Telegraph to hold that
discrimination against effeminate men was not actionable because such
sex-specific trait discrimination was impermissible only when the trait
involved was a fundamental right or an immutable characteristic).
128 Fundamental rights have been limited to such things as marrying and
having children. See e.g., Willingham, 507 F.2d at 1091.
129
The Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse necessarily rejected the
immutable trait/fundamental right approach from Martin Marietta.
Strangely, however, the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse did not even
mention Martin Marietta or the line of cases interpreting it so narrowly.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228.
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on discrimination based on traits that for social and cultural
reasons are strongly associated with a particular group
rather than on traits that for biological reasons are unique to
a particular race or sex group. Discrimination based on the
latter kind of traits are generally treated as simple types of
ontological discrimination.130
Group-identity arguments of this sort are most often
articulated and endorsed as a way of expanding Title VII’s
protection in race and national origin discrimination cases
involving facially neutral trait requirements. Barbara Flagg
and Paulette Caldwell, for example, both argue that Title VII
should prohibit discrimination based on race-oriented or
race-expressive traits in addition to discrimination based on
race per se.131 Flagg contends that Title VII is currently a
useful tool for black employees who act white and are
nonetheless treated differently because of their skin color,
but it is a much less effective tool for black employees who
act in certain racially identified ways and are discriminated
against because of these behavioral traits.132 Flagg argues
See e.g., the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, supra note __ (defining
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as a form of sex
discrimination), Rogers, supra note __ (suggesting in dicta that
discrimination based on a natural black hairstyle would constitute race
discrimination).
131 See Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently
White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L. J. 2009, 2015 (1995); Paulette
M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and
Gender, 1991 Duke L.J. 365 (1991). See also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111
YALE L. J. 769, 885-96 (arguing for Title VII protection against
discrimination based on mutable traits that are constitutive of group
identity).
132 Flagg offers for example the actual stories of two African American
sisters, Yvonne Taylor and Keisha Akbar (who had changed her name
from Deborah Taylor). Both sisters were smart and skillful in their
respective jobs, though they related to and expressed their racial
identities very differently. Yvonne adopted a personal style that “fell
well within the bounds of whites’ cultural expectations. Id. at 2009. Her
speech, dress, hairstyle and attitudes matched white norms. Id. at 2009.
Keisha, in comparison, placed a greater emphasis on her African
heritage. In addition to changing her name, Keisha “adopted speech and
130
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that Title VII should prohibit discrimination on the basis of
“personal characteristics that . . . intersect seamlessly with
[one’s racial] self-definition.”133
Caldwell makes a similar argument.
Caldwell
focuses her criticism on the case of Rogers v. American
Airlines.134 Renee Rogers worked as an airport operations
agent for American Airlines. She filed suit challenging
American’s grooming policy which prohibited employees in
high customer contact positions from wearing an all-braided
hairstyle.135 Rogers argued that the policy discriminated
against her as a woman, and, more specifically, as a black
woman because of the historical and cultural significance a
braided, or cornrow, hairstyle had for black women.136
Indeed, Rogers contended that the cornrows hairstyle “’has
been and continues to be part of the cultural and historical
essence of Black American women.’”137 The district court
rejected Roger’s discrimination claim concluding that
American’s policy, which applied neutrally to women and
men of all races, did not on its face discriminate in violation
of Title VII.138 Caldwell criticizes the court’s decision for
grooming patterns consistent with [her] cultural perspective” and
interpreted current events as instances of racism more than her white coworkers. Id. at 2010-11 and nn. 4-5. Both sisters faced adverse
employment actions that seemed race related. Flagg notes that while
Yvonne could easily frame a fairly standard disparate treatment claim
because of her compliance with white norms, Keisha would have a very
difficult time framing such a claim under existing judicial interpretations
of Title VII. Id. at 2014-15.
133 Id. at 2012. Flagg refers to adverse employment actions which result
from an individual possessing traits or attributes associated with racial
identity and deviating from white cultural norms as “transparently
white decisionmaking.” Id. at 2029 (according to Flagg, “[t]ransparently
white decisionmaking consists of the unconscious use of criteria of
decision that are more strongly associated with whites than with
nonwhites”).
134 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D. N.Y. 1981).
135 527 F. Supp. at 231.
136 527 F. Supp. at 231.
137 527 F. Supp. at 232.
138 527 F. Supp. at 231-32.
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failing to recognize and take seriously the connection
between braided hairstyles and black women’s racial
identity and for failing to extend Title VII protection to such
group-identified traits.139
Juan Perea makes a similar argument in the context of
Title VII’s bar on national origin discrimination.140 Perea
contends that most of the discrimination faced by ethnic
minorities results from their possession of certain traits, not
from the fact of their national origin or place of birth.141 As a
result, he argues, Title VII should protect against
discrimination
based
on
“physical
and
cultural
characteristics that make a social group distinctive either in
group members’ eyes or in the view of outsiders.”142 Perea
describes such characteristics as including, but not limited
to: “race, national origin, ancestry, language, religion, shared
history, traditions, values, and symbols, all of which
contribute to a sense of distinctiveness among members of
the group.”143
Drucilla Cornell and William Bratton make a similar
argument for extending Title VII to prohibit workplace rules
that penalize employees for speaking a language other than
English.144 They argue that “the legal system should treat
language as a fundamental identification encompassed by

Caldwell explains that “[w]herever they exist in the world, black
women braid their hair. They have done so in the United States for more
than four centuries. African in origin, the practice of braiding is as
American—black American—as sweet potato pie.” Caldwell, supra note
__ at 379. Indeed, Caldwell argues, “a black woman’s choice of
hairstyle, is associated in the minds of the women themselves and others
with an extension of the personality, a dignitary interest.” Id. at 386-87.
140 Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice: Reevaluating “National Origin”
Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1994).
141 Id. at 839.
142 Id. at 833.
143 Id. at 833.
144 See Drucilla Cornell and William W. Bratton, Deadweight Costs and
Intrinsic Wrongs of Nativism: Economics, Freedom, and Legal Suppression of
Spanish, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 595 (1999).
139
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each person’s right of personhood.”145 Title VII should,
therefore, prohibit English-only workplace regulations
because of “the value of linguistic and cultural
identifications to the individual person.”146 While Flagg and
Caldwell argue that protections of this sort are already called
for under Title VII’s existing language, 147 Cornell and
Bratton, along with Perea, argue for an explicit expansion of
Title VII to include certain group-identified traits.148
The EEOC has been fairly sympathetic to the idea that
group-identity-related traits should be protected under Title
VII. Indeed, in its Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
National Origin, the EEOC defined national origin
discrimination as “including, but not limited to, the denial of
equal employment opportunity because of an individual’s,
or his or her ancestor’s, place of origin; or because an
individual has the physical, cultural, or linguistic
145 Id. at 604. See also Linda M. Mealey, English-Only Rules and “Innocent”
Employers: Clarifying National Origin Discrimination and Disparate Impact
Theory Under Title VII, 74 MINN. L. REV. 387 (1989) (arguing that “it is
inappropriate to compare language with mutable characteristics such as
hairstyle. Language is more closely analogous to religion. Both are
‘mutable,’ yet both go to the core of the person and are not as easily
changed as hairstyle”).
146 Cornell and Bratton, supra note __ at 602.
147
Flagg argues that a “pluralist” interpretation of Title VII which
protects individuals from discrimination for possessing racially
identified traits and deviating from white cultural norms is in fact
“consistent with Title VII as written.” Flagg, supra note __ at 2037.
Although Caldwell makes this point less explicitly, she too seems to
believe that the Rogers decision was erroneously decided under existing
antidiscrimination law. See Caldwell, supra note __ at 387 (contending
that “[a]ntidiscrimination law should be, and at its best is, directed
toward the behavioral manifestations of such negative associations” with
racially identified traits).
148 Perea, supra note __ at 832. Perea proposes modifying Title VII to
read: “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, or ethnic traits.” Id. at 861.
See also Cornell and Bratton, supra note __ at 603-04.
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characteristics of a national origin group.”149 The agency
stressed that “the primary language of an individual is often
an essential national origin characteristic,”150 and Englishonly workplace rules “disadvantage[] an individual’s
employment opportunities on the basis of national
origin.”151 According to the EEOC, accent discrimination
could also, in some instances, constitute national origin
discrimination.152
Courts, however, have been much less favorable
toward this group-identity approach to antidiscrimination
law. In Rogers the district court accepted, for the purposes of
considering the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Roger’s
contention about the integraleness of cornrows to black
women’s cultural and historical identity.153 Nonetheless, the
court upheld American’s policy against cornrows stressing
both the neutrality of the policy--it applied to both sexes and
all races—and the fact that the trait at issue was not
immutable—even if it was “socioculturally associated with a
particular race.”154
In Garcia v. Gloor, the Fifth Circuit rejected the claim
of a Mexican-American employee that his employer’s rule
prohibiting bilingual employees engaged in sales work from
speaking Spanish on the job constituted discrimination on
the basis of national origin.155 Garcia argued that the
Spanish language “was the most important aspect of ethnic
identification for Mexican-Americans” so that the policy
against speaking Spanish constituted national origin
See 29 C.F.R.1606.1.
29 C.F.R. 1606.7(a).
151 29 C.F.R. 1606.7(a).
152 29 C.F.R. at 1606.6(b)(1).
153 Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
154 The court explained: “An all-braided hair style is an ‘easily changed
characteristic,’ and, even if socioculturally associated with a particular
race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the
application of employment practices by an employer.” Rogers, 527 F.
Supp. at 232.
155 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980).
149
150
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discrimination against Mexican Americans.156 The court,
however, refused to treat discrimination based on language
use as national origin discrimination. According to the
court, “Neither the statute nor the common understanding
equates national origin with the language that one chooses
to speak.”157 “National origin,” the court emphasized, “must
not be confused with ethnic or sociocultural traits . . . .”158

Id. at 267.
Id. at 268. The court did stress, however, that this case involved a
plaintiff who was “fully bilingual” and deliberately chose to speak
Spanish instead of English while at work. Id. at 268. To the court this
distinguished the case sharply from one involving a plaintiff who did
not speak English at all. Id. at 270. The court noted that there might be
circumstances in which “the ability to speak or the speaking of a
language other than English might be equated with national origin” and
suggested that “[t]he refusal to hire applicants who cannot speak English
. . . if the jobs they seek can be performed without knowledge of that
language” might be one example. Id. at 269-70.
158 Id. at 269. See also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1487-88 (9th
Cir. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that employer’s English only policy
as applied to bilingual employees had a disparate impact based on
national origin because the court held that the adverse effects were not
significant enough to be actionable, but also noting in dicta that Title VII
“does not protect the ability of workers to express their cultural heritage
at the workplace”); Fragante v. City and County of Honolulu, 888 F.2d 591,
596-99 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that employer’s refusal to hire otherwise
qualified applicant because of his foreign accent did not constitute
national origin discrimination because the accent materially affected his
ability to perform the job). Cf. Carino v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of
Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that employee had
proven actionable discrimination based on his “national origin and
related accent” and noting that “[a] foreign accent that does not interfere
with a Title VII claimant’s ability to perform duties of the position he has
been denied is not a legitimate justification for adverse employment
decisions”); Gutierrez v. Municipal Court of the Southeast Judicial District,
838 F.2d 1031, 1044 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that employer’s English-only
policy violated Title VII by causing a disparate impact on the basis of
national origin without business necessity and noting that “English-only
rules generally have an adverse impact on protected groups and
ordinarily constitute discriminatory conditions of employment”), vacated
as moot, 490 U.S. 1016 (1989).
156
157
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Both Rogers and Gloor involved neutral rather than
group-specific trait discrimination in that the challenged
employment rules applied to all employees. As a result,
both plaintiffs were able to raise disparate impact as well as
disparate treatment challenges.159 In both cases, however,
the courts concluded that the traits at issue—namely
hairstyle and choice of language—did not warrant
protection under the disparate impact doctrine. The Rogers
decision is vague and does not distinguish clearly between
its disparate impact and disparate treatment analysis.
Nevertheless, the opinion suggests two reasons for
dismissing Rogers’s disparate impact claim. First, Rogers
did not actually allege that the no cornrows policy
disproportionately affected black people.160 Second, the
disparate harm that Rogers did allege, namely an identity
harm to black women, was not one the court was willing to
recognize under the disparate impact framework. The court
focused instead on the mechanical ease with which black
women could change their hairstyle and thereby avoid
adverse impact. According to the court, because “[a]n allbraided hair style is an easily changed characteristic,”
disadvantageous treatment based on the trait did not
constitute an adverse impact for disparate impact
purposes.161
In Gloor the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the English-only rule had a disparate impact on
Hispanic-Americans by likewise focusing on the mutability
of the trait—speaking Spanish—at issue. According to the
court, “there is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the

EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000)
(emphasizing that a disparate impact claim requires the identification of
a specific facially-neutral practice responsible for the group-based
disparity).
160 The court noted: “Plaintiff does not allege that an all-braided hair
style is worn exclusively or even predominantly by black people.”
Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
161 Id. at 232 (internal quotations omitted).
159
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affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is
a matter of individual preference.”162
Although I have been focusing on group-specific
forms of trait discrimination challenged under the disparate
treatment framework rather than on neutral forms of trait
discrimination challenged under the disparate impact
framework, it is worth noting that these two types of trait
discrimination and the legal analyses they engender may not
be as distinct as they at first seem. There may, for example,
be instances in which a hiring requirement is stated
neutrally but works in practice to exclude only individuals
of a particular sex or race. It may not be clear in such cases
whether the requirement should be treated as neutral or
group-specific.163 Moreover, the judgment at the core of
both a disparate impact and disparate treatment based trait
discrimination claim may in fact be the same. A plaintiff
challenging a group-neutral form of trait discrimination
under the disparate impact doctrine must show, as a
preliminary matter, that the employment requirement at
issue causes a disparate adverse impact on individuals of a
particular protected group. In other words, the plaintiff
must show both disparity and adversity sufficiently severe
to be worth the court’s attention. 164 The courts in Rogers and
Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
This was, of course, the question faced by the Supreme Court in
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976). The employer’s
disability plan looked sex neutral to the extent that it denied pregnancy
benefits for women and men. It looked sex specific to the extent that it
denied women medical benefits while granting men benefits for
similarly disabling conditions. One could also imagine a company
policy prohibiting a particular kind of hairstyle which in fact could only
be worn by black (or white) women. Courts there too would be faced
with the question of whether such a policy was in fact race-neutral or
race-specific.
164
See Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that “[t]he crux of the dispute between Spun Steak and the
Spanish-speaking employees, . . ., is not over whether Hispanic workers
will disproportionately bear any adverse effects of the policy; rather, the
dispute centers on whether the policy causes any adverse effects at all,
162
163
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Gloor concluded that the required adversity only existed
when individuals of a particular group were being
disproportionately harmed for possessing traits that were
immutable.165 Sufficient adversity did not exist when
individuals were disadvantaged because of traits that they
could simply choose to change. 166 In fact, an immutability
requirement is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s
finding of disparate impact liability in Griggs v. Duke
Power.167 Certainly the lack of a high school diploma, which
was one trait being challenged in Griggs, is a mutable
characteristic. What really seems to be at issue in this first
level of disparate impact analysis is, therefore, not the
immutability of the group-associated trait per se, but a more
vague judicial determination that the trait at issue is one that
individuals must not, at least not unnecessarily, be
disadvantaged for possessing. If the trait is deemed worthy
of protection, the employer can only make employment
decisions based on it if doing so satisfies the business
necessity requirement.168 The core question under both
and if it does, whether the effects are significant,” and ultimately
rejecting bilingual employees’ disparate impact challenge to employer’s
English-only rule).
165 See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232; Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270.
166
See Rogers, 527 F. Supp at 232 (emphasizing that cornrows were
different from the immutable characteristics entitled to protection under
Title VII because cornrows are “not the product of natural hair growth
but of artifice”); Gloor, 618 F.2d at 270 (emphasizing that “Mr. Garcia
could readily comply with the speak-English-only rule; as to him
nonobservance was a mater of choice”).
167 Griggs v. Duke Power, 410 U.S. 424 (1971).
168 Once a court recognizes that a particular trait requirement causes a
legally cognizable disparate impact on a protected group, the employer
must respond by showing that the trait requirement satisfies some
business necessity. An employer would probably not, however, be able
to justify the trait requirement and resulting disparate impact by arguing
that its customers simply do not like dealing with employees with that
trait. Once the trait is deemed worthy of protection under the disparate
impact framework (because disadvantage based on the trait is deemed a
recognizable adversity), such preferences themselves would probably
look like a form of status discrimination. Consider, for example, a court
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disparate treatment and disparate impact analyses really
becomes whether the trait at issue is one an individual
should be protected in possessing. The answer to this
question is distinct from the framework under which the
trait discrimination claim is brought.
Despite scholars’, if not courts’, support for a groupidentity approach to trait discrimination in race and national
origin cases, there are significant practical and theoretical
problems with this approach. While most of the problems
apply regardless of whether this approach is applied in race,
national origin, or sex discrimination cases, and regardless of
whether the trait discrimination at issue is facially neutral or
group-specific, I will focus in this section on why this groupidentity approach is particularly inadequate for responding
to sex-specific forms of trait discrimination.

faced with a claim similar to that raised in Rogers except in this case the
court concludes that the plaintiff has shown a legally cognizable
disparate impact on black women stemming from the no cornrows
policy. In other words, the court concludes that the wearing of
cornrows, like the lack of a high school diploma, is a trait which
individuals should not simply be expected to change but one which they
are entitled to some protection in possessing. If the court recognizes the
disparate impact caused by the no cornrows policy, it is unlikely then
that the employer could defend this policy by showing that customers do
not like dealing with people with cornrows. Once cornrows are treated
as a trait important enough to warrant some protection when possessed
by black women, then customer preferences not to deal with people with
this trait become a delegitimized form of status discrimination.
Consider, a different example. An employer has a prohibition on hiring
individuals who wear head coverings to work. Plaintiffs sue arguing
that the prohibition has a disparate impact on Muslim women. The
court agrees that the prohibition causes a disparate, and sufficiently
adverse, impact on Muslim women because of their religion. Once the
court makes this determination, it is unlikely that the employer would
then be able to justify its no headscarves policy by pointing to its
customers’ preferences not to deal with employee’s in headscarves.
Head scarves become associated with Muslim women in such a way that
makes anti-headscarf customer preferences seem like impermissible
status discrimination.
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The first and most obvious difficulty with this
approach is identifying traits that are integral to one’s
identity as a woman or man. Identifying traits that are
integral to group identity is difficult when the group at issue
is race- or national origin-based, but it is probably even more
difficult when the group at issue is gender-based. Is wearing
dresses, jewelry or makeup integral to women’s gender
identity? Or are these traits too trivial to be deemed critical
to gender-identity? Is talking in relational terms and placing
a priority on relationships rather than informal rights
integral to women’s gender identity?169 Are any traits other
than those distinctly related to biology and reproduction
really integral to women’s group identity?170
For a trait to be considered integral to group identity
must the trait be possessed by 50% of the members of the
group, 75% of the members, 90% of the members or just
some lesser “critical mass” of members?171 How long must
the trait have been associated with the group’s shared
identity? Does it matter if a trait has been widely associated
with the group for 10 years or 100 years?172
Carol Gilligan famously argued that women more than men think of
moral problems as arising from “conflicting responsibilities rather than
from competing rights and requir[ing] for [their] resolution a mode of
thinking that is contextual and narrative rather than formal and
abstract.” CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 19 (1982).
170
See Yoshino, supra note __ 906-913 (describing the demand that
women make pregnancy and motherhood easy to ignore as a kind of sex
discrimination in which women are required to “mute their identities”).
171 Juan Perea raised this point when he asked: “how much correlation is
enough to establish that an ethnic trait is actually a proxy for prohibited
race or national origin discrimination? If fifty percent of the members of
an ethnic group share a trait, is this sufficient for the trait to function as a
proxy for the ethnic group? If two-thirds of American Latinos are
bilingual, is this enough to establish Spanish English bilingualism as a
proxy for Latino ethnicity? Is ninety percent required?” Perea, supra note
__ at 852.
172
In Rogers, for example, the district court emphasized that the
plaintiff’s braided hairstyle had only recently become “popularized” (by
Cicely Tyson and then by Bo Derek). Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
Paulette Caldwell, however, in arguing that the court should have
169
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Even if one could determine some method for
identifying group-integral traits that went beyond the purely
biological, equating discrimination based on these traits with
sex discrimination serves to essentialize and define women
in terms of the traits they have been historically allowed to
have. Protecting these socially identified traits reinforces
women’s commitment to them. Such traits may, however,
be the product of women’s subordinate social status, and
may not in any deeper way represent “authentic” women’s
culture. 173 Moreover, and more importantly, these may not
be traits that women should or do want to retain.
Catharine MacKinnon has made precisely this point
in response to Carol Gilligan’s work describing women’s
different and more relational moral voice as compared to
men. MacKinnon criticizes the idea that women should seek
to reify in any way the traits that have historically
distinguished them from men. “For women to affirm
difference,” she contends, “when difference means
dominance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the
qualities and characteristics of powerlessness.”174
Richard Ford makes a similar point with respect to
racially identified traits.
Ford worries about
“misrecognizing” groups by legally ascribing to them
cultural traits and attributes that have come to be associated
with the group over time. Ford explains that “[t]he harm of
misrecognition is that members of the misrecognized group
may internalize the depreciating stereotypes of others. Such
individuals, then, may not always appropriately determine
protected plaintiff’s braided hairstyle as a direct extension of her race
asserted that African American women had worn braided hairstyles for
more than four centuries. Caldwell, supra note __ at 379.
173 As Catharine MacKinnon contends: “Women have a history all right,
but it is a history both of what was and what was not allowed to be. So I
am critical of affirming what we have been, which necessarily is what we
have been permitted, as if it is women’s, ours, possessive.” CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 39
(1987).
174 MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED supra note __ at 39.
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what is fundamental to their identity, or better put, what
should be fundamental to their identity.”175 Ford is primarily
concerned with challenging racial hierarchy and
subordination. He questions whether legally enshrining
existing group-identified traits—which may themselves be
the result of this social subordination—is the best way to end
racial oppression.176 “It is by no means clear,” Ford argues,
“that an argument that presumes that blacks or black
women have a cultural essence as blacks or black women is a
vehicle of racial empowerment.”177
Not only does the group-identity approach to trait
discrimination essentialize group members in ways that may
not be either authentic or beneficial, it also permits
individual plaintiffs, through the use of private lawsuits, to
do the defining. Individual plaintiffs and individual courts
will effectively have the power to decide often contested
questions about what traits and attributes are groupidentified. Rather than forcing the group as a collective to
determine its identity and to confront inner-group conflicts,
the group-identity approach to trait discrimination
effectively gives individual plaintiffs and judges the power
to define what may be highly contested group identities.178
Richard T. Ford, Beyond “Difference” : A Reluctant Critique of Legal
Identity Politics, in LEFT LEGALISM/ LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet
Halley eds.) 55 (2002).
176 See Richard T. Ford, Race as Culture? Why Not? 47 UCLA L. REV. 1803,
1805 (2003) (“antiracism’s goal must be to dismantle the practices and
institutions that continue to produce and to reinforce racial
subordination—not to safeguard (and thereby fix) individuals or groups
in their ascribed characteristics”).
177 Ford, Beyond Difference, supra note __ at 40
178
Ford makes this point with respect to the question of whether
cornrows should be treated as a race-identified trait. Ford notes:
“Suppose some black women employed by American Airlines wished to
wear cornrows and advance the political message they ostensibly
embody, and others thought cornrows damaged the interests of black
women in particular and reflected badly on the race as a whole. . . . Now
Roger’s claim is no longer plausibly described as a claim on behalf of
black women. Instead, it is a claim on behalf of some black women over
175
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In fact, the group-identity approach forces courts to make
decisions among potentially competing claims about what
constitutes group identity.179 These decisions then affect not
only the individual litigants but all members of the group
whose cultural identity has, as a result, been more sharply
defined.
On a practical level, the group-identity approach is
inadequate as a response to sex-specific trait discrimination
because this approach would not protect women who are
singled out for adverse treatment precisely because they
deviate from gender stereotypes. For example, while it is not
clear what traits might be considered integral to women’s
gender-group identity, it is certainly the case that
aggressiveness and competitiveness would not be among
them. A court interpreting Title VII to protect only groupintegral traits would not, therefore, protect Ann Hopkins
and other women harmed because of their deviation from
traditional gender norms. As was the case with the
immutable/fundamental trait approach, such a narrow
response to trait discrimination is not consistent with Title
VII’s antidiscrimination goals. Indeed, the group-identity
approach, given its tendency to reify existing gender norms,
is more likely to entrench than to challenge group-based
subordination.
IV.

Mechanism of Harm Approach
An alternative to the approaches discussed in the last
section is to focus not on the nature of the trait for which
women (or men) are harmed, but on the mechanism by
which they are harmed. Under this approach, if a group of
the possible objections of other black women.” Ford, Beyond Difference
supra note __ at 39.
179 See Ford, Race as Culture? supra note __ at 1811 (“The rights argument
that protects culture as the authentic expression of the individual litigant
must invite—in fact it must require—courts to determine which
expressions are authentic and therefore deserving of protection. The
result will often be to discredit anyone who does not fit the culture style
ascribed to her racial group”).
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women is treated worse than other women and men in the
workplace, what is important for determining whether such
treatment constitutes actionable sex discrimination is not
why the women were singled out but the means by which
they were harmed. If the mechanism of harm is sexualized
abuse and harassment, then the discrimination is considered
to be because of sex under the meaning of Title VII.
Otherwise, the trait discrimination is not actionable. As
Vicki Schultz has shown, this was effectively the approach
courts took in determining when harassment creating a
hostile work environment was actionable. 180 Harassing
conduct that was sexual in nature was deemed to be because
of sex, and potentially actionable under Title VII,181 while
conduct that was not sexual in nature was deemed
necessarily to not be because of sex.182
See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 1686
(“The prevailing paradigm for understanding sex-based harassment
places sexuality—more specifically, male-female sexual advances—at the
center of the problem”).
181
The conduct was potentially actionable because the other
requirements for actionable sexual harassment still had to be shown. In
order to state a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment a
plaintiff must show: “(1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2) the
harassment was because of sex; (3) the harassment was sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an
abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for imposing liability on
the employer.” Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801 (4th Cir. 1998). See also
Leibowitz v. New York City Transit Authority, 252 F.3d 179, 189 (2nd Cir.
2001 (same); Bowman v. Shawnee State University, 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th
Cir. 2000) (same); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir.
1982) (quoted with approval in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 67 (1986).
182 Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 1689
(“Courts consider only sexual advances or other sexual conduct for
purposes of establishing hostile work environment harassment, and they
consign less sexual forms of misconduct to a separate disparate
treatment analysis (if they consider such forms at all)”). See e.g., King v.
Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System, 898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir.
1990) (holding that discriminatory treatment by one supervisor that was
sexual in nature was sexual harassment while discriminatory treatment
by another supervisor that was not sexual in nature was not); Turley v.
180
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One initial problem with the mechanism of harm
approach to trait discrimination is determining when
conduct is sexual in nature. Is it sexual for a man to touch a
woman’s buttocks?183 Is it sexual for a man to stroke a
woman’s hair?184 Is it sexual for a man to grab another
man’s genitals?185 Is it sexual for a man to call a woman a
cunt or a bitch or a broad?186 Is it sexual for a man to call
another man an asshole or a pussy?187
Is posting
Union Carbide Corp., 618 F. Supp. 1438, 1442 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (holding
that plaintiff had not established actionable sexual harassment because
she “was not subjected to harassment of a sexual nature”); Walker v.
Sullair Corp., 736 F. Supp. 94, 100 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (dismissing plaintiffs
hostile environment claim based on harassment that was non sexual in
nature and explaining that “[s]exual harassment based on a hostile work
environment exists where there are sexual advances”); Downes v. FAA,
775 F.2d 288, 290 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Sexual harassment is used herein in
the sense of offensive behavior of a sexual nature which is prohibited by
Title VII”).
183 See Campbell v. Board of Regents, 770 F. Supp. 1479, 1486 (D. Kan 1991)
(treating a man’s slapping of a woman on the buttocks as a sexual act).
184 See Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 295 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that a
man stroking a woman’s hair at work may or may not be a sexual
gesture).
185 See Quick v. Donaldson Co., 895 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D. Iowa 1995)
(stating that “[t]he only thing sexual about ‘bagging’ [one man grabbing
another man’s genitals] is that the aggressor aims his non-sexual
aggression at genitals”). But see Belleville, 119 F.3d at 580 (stating:
"Frankly we find it hard to think of a situation in which someone
intentionally grabs another's testicles for reasons entirely unrelated to
that person's gender.").
186 See Galloway v. General Motors Serv. Parts Operations, 1994 WL 673061,
*3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 1994) (concluding that a man calling a female
coworker a “sick bitch” “was not overtly sexual in nature”); Steiner v.
Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1463-64 (treating man’s references
to female coworker as a “cunt” and “dumb fucking broad” as “sexually
explicit and offensive terms,” and contending in dicta that referring to a
woman as a “worthless broad” was a sexual epithet); Woerner v.
Brzeczek, 519 F. Supp. 517, 520 N.D. Ill. 1981) (stating in dicta that male
supervisor’s reference to a female police office as “that broad” was a
“sexually-oriented epithet”).
187 See Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464 (noting in dicta that calling a man an
asshole was not a sexual epithet).
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pornography in the workplace sexual?188 As Schultz has
noted, courts have had a difficult time agreeing when
conduct is sexual in nature, particularly when the conduct at
issue involves crude or sexually suggestive comments as
opposed to physical touching.189 While some courts have
taken an expansive view of what constitutes conduct that is
sexual in nature, other courts have been far more
restrictive.190
A more significant problem with the mechanism of
harm approach is justifying why—beyond simply intuition
or common sense—conduct that singles out certain women
or men for particularly harsh treatment should be
considered to be because of sex simply because the conduct
is sexual in nature.191 There are two rationales, arising out of
See Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995)
(suggesting in dicta that the display of pornographic pictures in the
workplace is sexual conduct).
189 See Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 174647.
190 See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 n.3 (3rd Cir.
1190) (describing "sexual propositions, innuendo, pornographic
materials, sexual[ly] derogatory language" as all actions that are "sexual
by their very nature"). But see Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV.
813, 840 (1991) (arguing that "courts tend to define 'sexual' very narrowly
based on a man's view of a man's acts.").
191 Often in the sexual harassment context courts simply conclude
without argument or explanation that conduct that is sexual in nature is
necessarily because of sex. See e.g., Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482 n. 3 ("The
intent to discriminate on the basis of sex in cases involving sexual
propositions, innuendo, pornographic materials, or sexual [sic]
derogatory language is implicit, and thus should be recognized as a
matter of course. A more fact intensive analysis will be necessary where
the actions are not sexual by their very nature."); Konstantopoulos v.
Westvaco Corp., 893 F. Supp. 1263, 1277 (D. Del. 1994) ("Because at least
some of the conduct at issue was sexually explicit, it is fair to draw the
conclusion that, by virtue of the conduct, plaintiff suffered intentional
discrimination because of her sex"); Cline v. General Elec. Credit Auto
Lease, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 650, 654 (N.D. Il. 1990) ("Sexual harassment cases
differ because the discriminatory nature of the charged conduct speaks
for itself"); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994) (contending
that "[s]exual harassment is ordinarily based on sex. What else could it be
188
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the sexual harassment literature, for treating sexual conduct
as being because of sex. However, while each rationale
justifies treating some sexual conduct as being because of
sex, neither justifies treating all such conduct as being
because of sex and hence actionable under Title VII.
One reason for treating sexual conduct as being
because of sex emphasizes the role sexuality has played and
continues to play in maintaining and reinforcing gender
hierarchy. The argument is that sexual conduct has been
used historically and systematically to control and oppress
women. Sexual abuse and violence is a, if not the, dominant
means by which men enforce and maintain their social
power and control over women. The use or threat of male
sexual violence toward women is not isolated and discrete.
It both reinforces and benefits from a sex-based social
hierarchy. As Catharine MacKinnon most notably has
argued:
Sexual harassment . . . is not merely a parade of
interconnected consequences with the potential
for discrete repetition by other individuals, so
that a precedent will suffice. Rather, it is a
group-defined injury which occurs to many
different individuals regardless of unique
qualities or circumstances, in ways that
connect with other deprivations of the same
individuals, among all of whom a single
characteristic—female sex—is shared. Such an
injury is in essence a group injury.192
As a result of the social importance of sex as a means
of gender-based control, it does not matter why any
individual man chooses to sexually harass any individual
based on?"); Belleville, 119 F.3d at 576 ("Arguably, the content of that
harassment [involving explicit sexual overtures] itself demonstrates the
nexus to the plaintiff's gender that Title VII requires.").
192
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 172 (1979).
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woman, the fact that the means chosen for the abuse are
sexual warrants treating the conduct as being because of sex.
The mechanism of harm was invariably chosen because of
the particular power that male-female sexual abuse has in
this society.193 Sexual harassment puts a woman in her place
not only as a worker, but as a woman.194 Moreover, given
the ubiquitous threat of sexual violence to women, each
instance of sexual harassment by a man toward a woman
reemphasizes the looming threat of sexual violence toward
all women.195 Sexual harassment of women by men also
reinforces a particular social message that women are
primarily, and in all contexts, sexual objects while men are
both social and sexual agents.196 This message is reinforced
See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 830 (1991)
(arguing that workplace conduct that is sexual in nature is particularly
dangerous and harmful to women).
194 See MACKINNNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra
note __ at 174 ("Sexual harassment perpetuates the interlocked structure
by which women have been kept sexually in thrall to men and at the
bottom of the labor market. Two forces of American society converge:
men's control over women's sexuality and capital's control over
employees' work lives.").
195 See Rosa Ehrenreich, Dignity and Discrimination: Toward a Pluralistic
Understanding of Workplace Harassment, 88 GEO. L. J. 1, 33 (1999) ("The
common law showed little ability to take into account broad sociohistorical changes like the massive influx of women into the workplace
and showed less ability to understand that while one crude proposition
to one woman on the job might not be earth-shattering, when thousands
of women faced this in the workplace everyday, the series of comments
could become a significant bar to the workplace happiness and
advancement of women as a group.")
196 Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? 49 STAN.
L. REV. 691, 693 (1997) (arguing that "the sexual harassment of a woman
by a man is an instance of sexism precisely because the act embodies
fundamental gender stereotypes: men as sexual conquerors and women
as sexually conquered, men as masculine sexual subjects and women as
feminine sexual objects"). See also MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN 179 ("sex stereotype is present in the male attitude,
expressed through sexual harassment, that women are sexual beings
whose privacy and integrity can be invaded at will, beings who exist for
men's sexual stimulation and gratification").
193
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even if it is only one or two women in each workplace,
rather than all women in all workplaces, who are subject to
such sexual advances.197 For these reasons, even if sexual
conduct from a man to a woman in a particular workplace is
itself driven by personal animosity or workplace fights
rather than by the woman's sex per se, 198 the fact that a male
co-worker or supervisor chooses sexuality as the mechanism
by which to harm the woman, rather than some other
means, should make the conduct actionable under Title
VII.199
This sex as subordination argument is, of course, most
persuasive in explaining why a man’s sexual targeting of a
woman should always be treated as a form of sex
discrimination. It is less clear under this argument why all
male on male sexual targeting should also be considered so.
Such conduct does not look like an attempt by men to

See e.g., MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 180
("[S]exual harassment forms an integral part of the social stereotyping of
all women as sexual objects and each individual grievant is but one
example of it").
198 But see, Mark Mclaughlin Hager, Harassment as a Tort: Why Title VII
Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REV. 375,
379-82 (1998) (arguing that often sexual harassment of women by men is
motivated not by contempt for women as a group but disrespect or
dislike for the woman as an individual).
199 See MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra
note __ at 177 (arguing that "[a] guarantee against discrimination
'because of sex' has little meaning if a major traditional dynamic of
enforcement and expression of inferior sex status is allowed to persist
untouched"); Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note
__ at 769 (concluding that "where a woman alleges that she has been
sexually harassed by a man, a lower quantum of proof is sufficient to
trigger an inference of sex discrimination because larger cultural norms
of women as sex objects and men as sex subjects have been reproduced
in the offending conduct"). See also, Belleville, 119 F.3d at 572 ("…the
historic imbalance of power between men and women in the workplace
offers a very compelling reason why the sexual harassment of a woman
by a male superior or co-worker should be understood as sex
discrimination.").
197
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express hatred of or to degrade their own sex as a group.200
Nor does the mechanism necessarily reinforce a sex-based
hierarchy in which men as a group are oppressed.
Feminist scholars have persuasively argued that at
least some forms of male-male sexual harassment are best
understood as efforts to maintain and protect the very same
hetero-masculine norms that are critical to men's dominance
over women in the workplace and that are enforced through
the more standard variety of male-female sexual harassment.
As Franke has argued:
[S]exual harassment is understood as a
mechanism by which an orthodoxy regarding
masculinity and femininity is enforced, policed
and
perpetuated
in
the
workplace.
Unwelcome and offensive conduct by men
directed at women that has the effect of
reducing women's identity to that of a sex
object while figuring men's identity as that of a
sex subject is one example of gender
subordination. But so is the sexual harassment
of . . . men who were insufficiently masculine
and as a result were punished by their male
coworkers with a campaign of unwelcome
offensive, and hostile conduct of a sexual
nature.201
Kathryn Abrams similarly views, at least some types, of
male-male sexual harassment as a means of "asserting the
primacy of male prerogatives or norms in the workplace"202

See e.g., Goluszek v. H.P. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il. 1988)
(dismissing the sex discrimination claim of a man who was harassed
sexually by male co-workers because the harassment did not create an
anti-male environment and hence was not because of sex under Title
VII).
201 Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ at 760.
202 See Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment supra note __
at 1209.
200
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by punishing men who deviate from appropriate gender
roles.203
Yet, even if one finds this argument persuasive, it
does not support a conclusion that all male-on-male
employment discrimination that is sexual in nature is
properly considered to be discrimination because of sex. 204
While it may make sense, for example, to consider the sexual
harassment of effeminate men by other men as an attempt to
maintain traditional gender norms and, by extension, men's
social dominance over women, there is no reason to treat
men's sexualized harassment of a hypermasculine gay man
in the same way. The hypermasculine gay man is privately
challenging norms of heterosexuality—which may, of
course, be the reason for the harassment—but his
harassment does not police traditional norms of
appropriately masculine workplace behavior.
The
subordination argument also does not justify treating malemale sexualized harassment motivated by the target's age or
race, or by personal animosity or workplace disputes, as
See Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject supra note __ at
2516. See also MacKinnon, Amici Brief in support of petitioner in Oncale,
1997 WL 471814 (arguing that sexual harassment is used by men to keep
other men in line and to maintain masculine dominance in the
workplace). See also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment
supra note __ at 1776 (explaining that “[j]ust as dominant male workers
may harass women who threaten their idealized image of masculinity on
the job, they may also harass such nonconforming men. This form of
harassment, like harassment of women workers, perpetuates job
segregation by sex.”).
204 Franke states, for example, that "when a gay male supervisor requests
sexual favors of a male subordinate no larger cultural gender orthodoxy
is being policed, perpetuated or enforced" and, as a result, such conduct
does not constitute actionable sexual harassment. See Franke, What’s
Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ at 767. Moreover, Franke
contends that male-male harassment perpetuated by predominantly
straight men on other straight men creating a fraternity-like culture
permeated with sexual talk and taunts does not constitute sex
discrimination until the "enlightened man" complains of the conduct and
is then specifically "targeted for hostile treatment because of his failure to
conform to the workplace norms." Id. at 768-69.
203
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being because of sex since such conduct again does not
police or promote traditional gender roles and sex-based
hierarchy.
Similarly, the subordination argument does not
justify treating an effeminate gay man's sexual harassment of
a normatively masculine straight man as discrimination
because of sex. The effeminate gay man's use of sexuality to
harm another man does not reinforce or police traditional
gender roles that maintain men's dominance over women.
Finally, the sex as subordination argument does not justify
treating the sexualized harassment of a woman by another
woman which is motivated by sexual desire (as opposed to a
sense of inappropriate femininity) as being discrimination
because of sex. This harassment too, although sexual in
nature, does not serve to reinforce gender roles and sexbased hierarchy.
The sex as subordination argument is not without
persuasive power, but it does not justify treating all sexual
conduct in the workplace as necessarily being because of sex.
It is far too tenuous to conclude that all sexual conduct
which targets particular women or men reinforces the sexbased subordination of women to men and is, therefore, a
form of sex discrimination under Title VII.
A second reason to focus on sexual conduct relies on
the assumption that such conduct is motivated by attraction
and would not occur if the target was of the other sex. As
David Schwartz has noted, “[t]he earliest precedents
recognizing a Title VII cause of action for sexual harassment
relied on a sexual-desire-based notion of causation.”205 As
with the subordination-based rationale, however, the
attraction-based rationale can justify treating only a subset of
the instances in which sexual conduct is used to
disadvantage particular female or male employees as being
because of sex.
In practice, courts have used the attraction-based
rationale to justify treating sexual harassment by a man
205

See Schwartz, supra note __ at 1719.
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(presumed to be heterosexual) of a woman as being because
of sex, and harassment by a man (known to be gay) of
another man as being because of sex.206 As the Supreme
Court explained in Oncale:
Courts and juries have found the inference of
discrimination easy to draw in most malefemale sexual harassment situations, because
the challenged conduct typically involves
explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity;
it is reasonable to assume those proposals
would not have been made to someone of the
same sex. The same chain of inference would
be available to a plaintiff alleging same-sex
harassment, if there were credible evidence
that the harasser was homosexual.207
Courts often treat other types of sexual conduct, most
notably that by heterosexually identified men toward other
See e.g., Belleville, 119 F.3d at 577 (“The familiar notion is that a
woman sexually harassed by a man may claim discrimination under
Title VII because the harasser is, presumably, heterosexual and would
not have bothered her if she were a man”); Simenton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d
33, 37 (2nd Cir. 2000) (“In the context of male-female sexual harassment,
involving more or less explicit sexual proposals, it is easy to infer
discrimination because of sex since ‘it is reasonable to assume those
proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex’”)
(citation omitted); Jones v. Flagship Int’l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 n.5 (5th Cir.
1986) (“Except in the exceedingly atypical case of a bisexual supervisor,
it should be clear that sexual harassment is discrimination based on
sex”); Horn v. Duke Homes, 755 F.2d 599, 604 (7th Cir. 1985) (“But for
Horn’s womanhood, [her supervisor] would not have demanded sex as a
condition of employment”). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 &
n. 55 (noting in dicta that sexual harassment of a man by a male coworker is sex discrimination if motivated by sexual attraction such that it
would not have occurred had the target been a woman); Peric v. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Il,, 1996 WL 515175 at *3 (N.D. Il Sept. 6, 1996) (same),
Raney v. Dist. of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 288 (D.D.C. 1995) (same),
EEOC v. Walden Book Co., Inc., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1103-04 (M.D. Tenn.
1995) (same).
207 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
206
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men, as not being because of sex.208 Courts simply assume
that when publicly heterosexual men act sexually toward
women this is motivated by sexual attraction and when
these same men act sexually toward other men it is not.
While courts make oversimplifying assumptions
about the binary nature of sexual desire and the meanings
and motives of human sexual conduct, they are probably
right in concluding that not all conduct that is sexual in
nature is motivated by sexual desire.209 Courts have noted
that heterosexual men may at times use sexual conduct as a
means of expressing dislike or hostility toward another man
without being motivated by sexual attraction toward the
See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191 (4th
Cir. 1996) (concluding that the verbal and physical assaults of a sexual
nature suffered by the plaintiff did not establish actionable sexual
harassment because they were committed by a heterosexual man against
another heterosexual man); Mayo v. Kiwest, 1996 WL 460769 (4th Cir. Aug.
15, 1996) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim
because although plaintiff was subjected to verbal and physical abuse
that was sexual in nature his attackers “were indisputably males and
Mayo makes no claim that either was homosexual or bisexual”); Walden
Book Co., 885 F. Supp. at 1102 (distinguishing the actionable same-sex
sexual harassment present in that case from the non actionable
harassment present in Goluszek by stating: “Goluszek is clearly
distinguishable from the instant case because Goluszek involved sexual
teasing of a heterosexual male by other heterosexual males rather than
sexual harassment of a subordinate by a homosexual supervisor.”).
209 See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure,
52 STAN. L. REV. 353 (2000) (evaluating the major sex studies measuring
the prevalence of bisexual orientation and noting that “each study found
the incidence of bisexuality was greater than or comparable to the
incidence of homosexuality”); Schwartz, supra note __ at 1763 (noting
that “the notion that harassment is ‘because of sex’ when demonstrably
based on sexual attraction posits a world of Kinsey zeroes and Kinsey
sixes . . . in which everyone is sexually attracted either to someone of the
opposite sex if heterosexual, or of the same sex if homosexual”); ALFRED
C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 610-66 (1948)
(rating heterosexuality and homosexuality on a zero to six scale and
explaining that “nearly half (46%) of the population engages in both
heterosexual and homosexual activities . . . in the course of their adult
lives”).
208
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target.210 It is likely that heterosexual men may also at times
choose sexual means to harm women because these means
are particularly hurtful and not because they are motivated
by sexual desire.211 It is perhaps not surprising then that the
Supreme Court in Oncale rather defensively proclaimed that
it had “never held that workplace harassment, even
harassment between men and women, is automatically
discrimination because of sex merely because the words
used have sexual content or connotations.”212 The attractionbased rationale, either with or without the courts’
simplifying assumptions about the binary nature of human
sexuality, simply cannot justify treating all discriminatory
conduct that is sexual in nature as being because of sex.
While the mechanism of harm approach to trait
discrimination treats too much conduct as actionable sex
discrimination, perhaps an even bigger problem with this
approach is the range of conduct it misses. Under the
mechanism of harm approach, a woman who is singled out
for discriminatory treatment because she is perceived as
particularly aggressive or competitive will not have a cause
See e.g., Spearman, 231 F.3d at 1085 (holding that even though
plaintiff's harassers used "sexually explicit, vulgar insults to express their
anger" with the plaintiff, their harassment was caused by "acrimony over
work-related disputes" and was not because of plaintiff's sex); Johnson v.
Hondo Inc., 125 F.3d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that sexually explicit
remarks made by male co-workers to male plaintiff were “simply
expressions of animosity or juvenile provocation” and were not made
because of plaintiff’s sex).
211
See Belleville, 119 F.3d at 590 (noting that “[m]en sexually harass
women in the workplace for reasons other than sexual desire”). See also
Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __ at 743
(arguing that “men engage in offensive sexual conduct in the workplace
primarily as a way to exercise or express power, not desire”);
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN supra note __ at
199 (“[M]ale sexual advances may often derive as much from fear and
hatred of women and a desire to keep them in an inferior place as from
genuine positive attraction or affection, although the perpetrator may be
unaware of his feelings”); Estrich, supra note __ (arguing that there is
something particularly harmful about sexual conduct in the workplace).
212 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
210
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of action if the discriminatory treatment takes the form of a
heavier than normal workload, particularly intense
monitoring, or denied promotions. Women who are singled
out because they have attributes that effectively challenge
the sex-based hierarchy of the workplace are not entitled to
protection under this approach unless their employer
chooses to harm them using sexual rather than nonsexual
means. As Schultz has argued in the context of analyzing
sexual harassment cases, courts’ narrow and exclusive focus
on the sexual nature of the harassment involved misses a
great deal of nonsexual conduct that serves to undermine
women’s competence in the workplace and their ability to
compete on equal terms with men.213 The mechanism of
harm approach to trait discrimination similarly misses much
trait discrimination that, while nonsexual in nature,
nonetheless serves to reinforce a sex-based employment
hierarchy.
Just as a sexuality-focused mechanism of harm
approach was an inadequate response to the question of
when harassment should be considered actionable sex
Shultz contends:
[The sexual desire-dominance paradigm] omits—and
even obscures—many of the most prevalent forms of
harassment that make workplaces hostile and alienating
to workers based on their gender. Much of what is
harmful to women in the workplace is difficult to
construe as sexual in design. . . . The prevailing
paradigm, however, may also be overinclusive. By
emphasizing the protection of women’s sexual selves
and sensibilities over and above their empowerment as
workers, the paradigm permits—or even encourages—
companies to construe the law to prohibit some forms of
sexual expression that do not promote gender hierarchy
at work.
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, supra note __ at 1689. See
also Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L. J. 2061 (2003)
(discussing the tendency of employers to unnecessarily sanitize the
workplace of sexual conduct that does not undermine women’s
competence ostensibly under the guise of Title VII’s sexual harassment
prohibitions).
213
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discrimination, so too is it an inadequate response to the
question of when trait discrimination should be considered
actionable sex discrimination. Focusing only on the means
by which certain women or men are singled out for
discriminatory treatment—without also looking at the social
meaning and effect of their being singled out—leads to
treating both too much and too little trait discrimination as
sex discrimination. In the next section, therefore, I present
an alternative response.
V.

Power/Access Approach
The power/access approach treats as actionable sex
discrimination only those forms of sex-specific trait
discrimination that are based on gender norms or scripts
that inhibit the ability of individuals of a particular sex to
participate successfully in the work world. Under this view,
Title VII does not require the elimination or nonenforcement
of all gender norms through rigidly neutral employment
rules. Instead, it requires the nonenforcement or elimination
of only those gender scripts and gender norms that actually
inhibit sex equality in the workplace.214
Sex-specific forms of trait discrimination generally
arise out of and reflect gender norms. The reason an
employer allows women but not men to wear dresses is
because women who wear dresses are social conformists
while men who wear dresses are not. The power/access
approach demands an examination of the gender norms
driving the trait discrimination in each case.
The
power/access approach recognizes that all gender norms are
not created equal. Some are far more dangerous to sex
Robert Post has offered a similar interpretation of Title VII. Post
explains that “customary gender norms are incorporated into the very
meaning and texture of Title VII. So far from striking ‘at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex
stereotypes,’ the statute in fact negotiates the ways in which it will shape
and alter existing gender norms.”
Robert C. POST, PREJUDICIAL
APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 39
(2001).
214
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equality than others. Moreover, it also recognizes the
significant costs both to employers and to employees that are
likely to flow from an enforced blindness to all gender
norms. The power/access approach calls, therefore, for a
necessarily context specific process of social transformation
whereby nondiscrimination is equated not with formal
neutrality, but with the elimination of only particularly
harmful or limiting gender norms.215
Because the
power/access approach determines when actionable sex
discrimination exists not by following an abstract rule but by
looking at the social meanings and effects of sex-specific trait
discrimination in each instance, the approach is best
explained through application.
A.

The Power/Access Approach Applied
The following examples help illuminate the approach
and clarify the ways in which it differs from the other
approaches to trait discrimination discussed thus far.
1.

Aggressive/Masculine Women
The power/access approach would treat an
employer’s discrimination against aggressive women as an
actionable form of sex discrimination even if the employer
had a stellar record of hiring women generally. If employers
were permitted to act upon the gender script equating
aggressiveness in women with bitchiness, all women would
be undermined in their ability to participate fully and
successfully in the workplace.
Aggressiveness and
Another way to conceive of my approach is as requiring employers to
change the work world to a degree, and then no farther. Title VII
requires employers to transform the work world so as to better fit and
include certain types of women and men, but not others. The line
between those who get protection and those who do not is neither
natural nor arbitrary, but the product of competing social concerns about
liberty and equality. For a similar argument made in a very different
context see Daniel Wikler, Paternalism and the Mildly Retarded, 8
PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 377 (1979. I thank Larry Alexander for
bringing this article to my attention.
215

89

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

competitiveness are almost always required, either explicitly
or instrumentally, for an employee to move up the corporate
ranks.
Allowing employers to exclude aggressive,
competitive women because such women are perceived as
unappealing would encourage all women to adopt
traditionally feminine, passive, and deferential attributes in
order to avoid such discrimination. Women with such traits,
however, would be less likely to move up the corporate
ladder. To the extent employers are permitted to act on the
norm against aggressiveness in women, women as a group
are hindered in their ability to integrate the work world and
end its sex-based hierarchy.
Consider, for example, a litigation law firm that
promotes almost exclusively from within its own ranks. The
hiring partners at the firm have no problem hiring women
and regularly hire entering classes that are fifty percent
women. The partners simply refuse to hire women who
they perceive to be aggressive, loud and competitive. The
partners just do not like women with these personality traits,
preferring women who are a bit more "girly," giggly, and
deferential. They regularly hire women from top law
schools who fit this mold. Despite the law firm’s frequent
hiring of female associates, very few women are invited to
join the partnership ranks. In order to become an equity
partner in the firm a candidate must have a reputation as a
tough and aggressive litigator and be able to bring business
into the firm. By the time associates reach the firm’s six year
up or out deadline, significantly fewer female associates
than male associates have these attributes. Without any
discrimination taking place at the time of the partnership
decision, far fewer women than men are promoted to
partner at the firm.
The Supreme Court recognized just such a catch-22 in
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. Ann Hopkins could not meet
the objective qualifications for partnership without being
personally aggressive, yet the perception of aggressiveness
as unappealing disqualified her.
The Court rightly
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concluded in that case that discrimination against aggressive
women constituted actionable sex discrimination. The
power/access approach, however, better articulates the
concerns motivating this judgment than did the trait equality
logic the court in fact relied upon.
2.

Effeminate/Nurturing Men
The power/access approach would also treat
discrimination against effeminate men as an actionable form
of sex discrimination. As numerous scholars have argued,
discrimination against effeminate men is often a means of
policing gender roles in the workplace and reaffirming
gender scripts that discourage men from engaging in
nurturing and caregiving activities.216 Such discrimination
pushes men to act in hyper masculine and traditionally
macho ways. While such role policing certainly confines
men, it also undermines women’s ability to compete
successfully in the workplace.
Enforcing a code of
hypermasculinity on male employees reinforces women's
position as different and other. Moreover, hypermasculinity
defines itself not only as different from that which is female
but as distinctly superior to it. Men exclude and harass
other men who seem too feminine in order to emphasize not
only their difference from but their dominance over that
which is feminine.217 Allowing employers to discriminate
against effeminate men reinforces gender norms by which
male workers are defined in large part by their superiority
See e.g., Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment? supra note __
at 760; Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment supra note __
at 1205; Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject supra note __ at
2516; Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment supra note __ at 1776.
217 Catharine MacKinnon, for example, analyzes both the cause and
desired effect of the harassment of a gender deviant man by his male coworkers as follows: "Goluszek was punished, ostracized, insulted, and
forced to consume pornography to make him conform to [his male coworkers'] stereotype of how a man should be a man by subordinating
women sexually." MacKinnon, Amici Brief in Oncale, 1997 WL 471814 at
*10-11, referring to Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il. 1988).
216
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over their female co-workers. Women will not be able to
compete effectively or fairly in the work world as long as
norms defining men as opposite and superior to women are
reinforced.
The power/access approach would for similar
reasons protect male employees from being discriminated
against for displaying nurturing or caregiving behavior that
female employees are permitted to engage in. Imagine a
male kindergarten teacher who is fired for exhibiting the
same kind of nurturing behavior that female teachers
regularly display with their students, and a male lawyer
who is terminated for arranging his work schedule to engage
in caregiving activities that his female colleagues routinely
schedule their work around. The power/access approach
would prohibit both types of trait discrimination because
both stem from and reinforce gender scripts which treat
nurturing and caregiving activities as appropriate and
laudable only for women. As long as such norms are
enforced and men are discouraged from being nurturing and
engaging in caregiving, women will continue to be
responsible for the bulk of these responsibilities. As long as
women continue to be dominantly responsible for these life
sustaining activities they will not be able to compete fully
and fairly with men in the public sphere.
3.

Men in Dresses
The power/access approach to trait discrimination
would not treat as an actionable form of sex discrimination
an employer's refusal to hire men who wear dresses to work
(or high heels, or lipstick) while not objecting to women
engaged in the same behavior.
Certainly, allowing
employers to act on gender norms frowning upon men in
dresses encourages discrimination against cross-dressing
men. Yet eradicating this particular gender norm is not
necessary for the substantive equality of women and men in
the work world. Men are not excluded from matching the
ideal worker by being prevented from wearing dresses. The
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ideal worker looks like a man in a suit. Women, likewise,
are not harmed by having male employees’ clothing choices
limited in a way theirs is not. Female employees may still
mimic the ideal male style or choose to dress in a way that is
more gender specific.
If employers were not permitted to adopt such a sexspecific “no men in skirts” work rule, they might, of course,
choose to permit both men and women to wear skirts.
Alternatively, and I have argued more likely, they would
simply not permit either sex to wear skirts. Women and
male cross-dressers then both lose. However, even, if
employers responded to a prohibition on sex-specific trait
discrimination by permitting men to wear dresses, it is
unlikely that this would improve the status or ability of
women to compete. Women seeking to be viewed as
competent and to be taken seriously in the work world seem
to benefit from downplaying rather than highlighting
gender differences.218 If a very large number of men began
wearing dresses to work, women might reap some benefits
from their easy fit within the new clothing norms. Such a
wave of men in women's clothes is, however, unlikely. It is
more likely that even if men were permitted to wear dresses,
workplace clothing norms would remain essentially the
same—a masculine version of androgyny.219 Indeed, men in
dresses might serve only to emphasize the nonnormativity
of feminine dress that is usually, although not exclusively,
associated with women. Allowing men to wear dresses
might actually serve to heighten workplace gender norms
See Sandra Monk Forsythe, Mary Frances Drake, and Charles A. Cox,
Jr., Dress As An Influence on the Perceptions of Management Characteristics in
Women, 13 HOME ECONOMICS RESEARCH J. 112 (1984) (explaining that
personnel administrators found female applicants for managerial
positions to be least forceful, self-reliant, dynamic, aggressive, and
decisive when they wore distinctly feminine clothing as compared to
more masculinely styled outfits); see also Sandra Forsythe, Mary Frances
Drake, and Charles A. Cox, Influence of Applicant's Dress on Interviewer's
Selection Decisions, 70 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 374 (1985).
219 Case, supra note __ at 7.
218
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even while blurring somewhat the equation of gender with
sex.
4.

Women in Pants
In contrast, the power/access approach would treat
an employer’s policy of prohibiting women from wearing
pants while allowing/requiring men to do so as a form of
sex discrimination.
The gender norm such trait
discrimination rests upon not only emphasizes women’s
difference from men and the ideal worker norm, but also
emphasizes their sexuality. Men continue to dominate the
upper echelons of the work world, and workplace norms for
both clothing and behavior continue to be, as Case described
them, "androgynous slanting toward the masculine."220
Requiring women to wear skirts emphasizes their difference
from men and from normative workplace behavior more
generally.
Moreover, such a requirement emphasizes
women’s femininity which may itself undermine their
perceived professional competence.221 Allowing employers
to act upon the gender script that women belong in skirts
prevents women from mimicking the normative dress code
of the ideal worker, maximizing their perceived competence,
and thereby optimizing their ability to compete as effectively
as possible against men in the work world.222
5.

The Sexually Harassed Woman/Man
As discussed in Part I, sexualized harassment of
women may sometimes be a form of ontological
discrimination—if all women in a workplace are harassed—
and at other times a form of trait discrimination—if only
particular women in a workplace are harassed. The
Case, supra note __ at 7.
See Forsythe, Drake, and Cox, supra note __ .
222 There has in fact been some legislative protection for women to wear
pants. See Cal. Gov't Code §12947.5(a) (Deering 1995) (providing that "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to
permit an employee to wear pants on account of the sex of the
employee.").
220
221
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harassment may look like a form of sex-specific trait
discrimination to the extent that women are being singled
out for harassment because of a particular trait—e.g.
physical attractiveness or professional aggressiveness—for
which men are not treated adversely. The discrimination
looks different from the other forms of sex-specific trait
discrimination discussed in that it does not involve a formal
employment requirement, yet the discrimination may still
act so as to informally exclude or disadvantage particular
types of women or men.
The power/access approach calls for treating
sexualized harassment of women by men as actionable sex
discrimination in all cases because of the method of
discrimination chosen, irregardless of its underlying cause.
Sexual violence by men against women is historically
pervasive.223 Sexual violence and the fear of sexual violence
keeps women passive, circumscribed in their movements,
and dependent upon men for protection.224 When a man
See e.g., CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 169 (1987)
(arguing that “[r]ape, battery, sexual harassment, forced prostitution,
and the sexual abuse of children emerge as common and systematic,”
and citing studies showing that up to 44 percent of American women
will be raped in their lifetime, and thirty-eight percent of girls are
sexually molested inside or outside the family); United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 633 (2000) (Souter dissent) (referring to evidence presented
before Congress in support of the Violence Against Women Act that
“’[a]ccording to one study, close to half a million girls now in high school
will be raped before they graduate” and “’[one hundred twenty-five
thousand] college women can expect to be raped during this—or any—
year’”) (internal citations omitted).
224
See Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal
Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 539 (1993) (arguing that
“street harassment severely restricts the physical and geographical
mobility of women. It not only diminishes a woman’s feelings of safety
and comfort in public places, but also restricts her freedom of movement,
depriving her of liberty and security in the public sphere”). See also
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 633 (2000) (Souter dissent)
(referring to evidence to Congress in support of the Violence Against
Women that “’[t]hree-quarters of women never go to the movies alone
after dark because of the fear of rape and nearly 50 percent do not use
223
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chooses sex as a means to hurt a woman he is taking
advantage of and reinforcing a gender script whereby
women are sexual victims vulnerable to attack by some men
and dependent on others for protection. It does not matter,
therefore, why certain women are singled out for abuse. The
fact that sexuality is used as the means to harm some women
reinforces a gender script that inhibits the social freedom
and workplace equality of all women.225
In contrast, the targeting and sexualized harassment
of certain men by other men in the workplace does not
warrant the same categorical treatment as sex discrimination
under the power/access approach.
Instead, closer
inspection is required into the cause for the harassment in
each case.
Male-male sexualized harassment does not by its very
nature reinforce a sex-based hierarchy in the way that malefemale sexualized harassment does. Often such harassment
does serve as a way to police gender roles and to reinforce
gender hierarchy by punishing men who do not behave in
appropriately masculine (and non feminine) ways. But
male-male sexual harassment is not always about policing
gender roles and does not always do so. At times such
abuse may be chosen as a way to punish a gender
public transit alone after dark for the same reason’”) (internal citation
omitted).
225 Bowman has made a similar argument about the significance and
impact of men’s street harassment of women. Bowman argues:
[A]ny incident of harassment, no matter how
“harmless,” both evokes and reinforces women’s
legitimate fear of rape. It does so by reminding women
that they are vulnerable to attack and by demonstrating
that any man may choose to invade a woman’s personal
space, physically or psychologically, if he feels like it.
Thus, street harassment forms part of a whole spectrum
of means by which men objectify women and assert
coercive power over them, one which is even more
invidious because it is so pervasive and appears,
deceptively, to be trivial.
Bowman, see supra note __ at 540.

96

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art15

TRAIT DISCRIMINATION AS SEX DISCRIMINATION

conforming man for other reasons—e.g. a workplace or
personal dispute. In such instances, sexual means are
chosen because they are particularly hurtful, but the
mechanism does not in such instances, in and of itself,
reinforce a sex-based hierarchy.
Therefore, unlike in male-female sexualized
harassment cases, in cases involving male-male sexualized
harassment, labeling the harassment as a form of sex
discrimination requires an exploration into the actual cause
for the harassment. To the extent the victims are being
singled out because of their effeminacy, then the harassment
looks
like an actionable form of sex-specific trait
discrimination—namely discrimination against effeminate
men. To the extent, however, that the harassment seems to
be based on and driven by personal or professional
animosity toward the targeted men, then the discrimination
does not seem to be motivated by a particular gender norm,
nor does it seem to be in anyway because of sex.
Harassment should not be treated as actionable sex
discrimination solely because one man chooses to express
his dislike for another through sexual means. Such means
should certainly be prohibited by employers, but they do not
translate all expressions of male-male hostility into
manifestations of sex discrimination.
6.

The Gay Man/Lesbian Woman
Sometimes an employer will freely hire both women
and men but simply refuse to hire women and men who are,
or are believed to be, gay. Clearly such discrimination is
trait-based in the sense that neither all women nor all men
are excluded, but only those with a particular trait.
Characterizing the discrimination as sex-specific or sexneutral is, however, more difficult and highlights the
fuzziness of the distinction. An employer could frame its
policy in a sex-neutral way as: “No gays allowed.”
Alternatively, an employer, or more likely a legal academic,
could frame its discrimination in a sex-specific way as: “No
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women who have sex with women. No men who have sex
with men.” Framing the discrimination in this sex-specific
and non neutral way leads to the conclusion that the
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination under the trait
equality approach. Such a conclusion does not, however,
follow under the power/access approach.
The requirement that a woman cannot have sex with
a woman while a man can have sex with a woman is
certainly based on a gender norm of appropriate social and
sexual behavior for women. Proper femininity requires
social and sexual attachment to men. Moreover, allowing
employers to act on this gender norm regarding appropriate
female behavior reinforces a particular social hierarchy. Yet
it is the hierarchy of straight women over gay women rather
the hierarchy of men over women. This distinction is
critical. There are good reasons to prohibit employers from
acting on gender norms equating proper femininity (or
masculinity) with heterosexuality and deviant femininity (or
masculinity) with homosexuality. Acting on these norms
reinforces the hierarchy of straight over gay. Acting on
these norms does not, however, reinforce the particular caste
hierarchy that Title VII was aimed at. 226
I have here distinguished conceptually between
discrimination against gay men and lesbians which I argue is
not properly conceived of as sex discrimination and
discrimination against effeminate men and masculine
women which I argue is. As a practical matter, it is, of
course, often difficult to distinguish between discrimination
because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of
226

See generally Stein, supra note __ at 503 (arguing that “Laws restricting
the rights of gay men and lesbians violate principles of equality
primarily because such laws discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, not because they discriminate on the basis of sex”); Cheshire
Calhoun, Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory, 104 ETHICS 558,
562 (1994) (contending that “patriarchy and heterosexual dominance are
two, in principle, separable systems. Even where they work together, it
is possible conceptually to puss the patriarchal aspect of male-female
relationships apart from their heterosexual dimensions”).
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gender nonconformity. Discrimination by men against other
men in the workplace often seems to be about both, or seems
to at least blend one with the other. In cases in which gender
nonconformity and homosexuality are both at issue, the
discrimination should be treated as actionable under Title
VII. The fact that discrimination may be motivated in part
by homosexual status should not strip discrimination based
on gender nonconformity of its protected status. However,
the mere fact that a gay person is targeted for discrimination
does not in and of itself warrant treating the conduct as sex
discrimination under the power/access approach.
It is worth emphasizing that the distinction I draw
between actionable and non actionable trait discrimination
does not depend on the mutability of the trait at issue. I
have argued that discrimination based on aggressiveness in
women is actionable while discrimination based on a man's
cross-dressing is not. It is not at all clear, however, that it is
any more difficult for an aggressive woman to change and
soften her mannerisms than it is for a man drawn to crossdressing to change his mode of attire. Both traits are
probably fairly mutable. My distinction also does not
depend on whether discrimination based on a particular
trait is likely to be random and idiosyncratic or systemic and
socially prevalent. Men in dresses, for example, probably
face more consistent workplace discrimination than do
aggressive/masculine women.
Instead, my distinction
between actionable and non actionable trait discrimination
relies on a determination about whether the discrimination
arises out of particular gender norms and scripts that society
must change in order to dismantle a sex-based hierarchy in
the work world. In the next section I provide a more
expansive defense of this approach.
B.

A More Expansive Defense
The power/access approach to trait discrimination
recognizes that sometimes an employer who freely hires
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women (or men) may still discriminate against a subset of
women (or men) in such a way as to reinforce a caste-like
hierarchy of men over women in the workplace. The
approach in effect responds to sex-specific forms of trait
discrimination in the same way the disparate impact
doctrine responds to sex-neutral forms of trait
discrimination: by focusing on whether the trait
requirements act as “build-in headwinds” to the effective
participation of members of a protected group.227
By focusing on the source and effect of particular
types of sex-specific trait discrimination, the power/access
approach avoids the underinclusiveness problems of the
immutable trait/fundamental right, group-identity, and
mechanism of harm approaches.
It also avoids the
overinclusiveness problems of the trait equality approach.
In practice, the power/access approach and the trait
equality approach will usually reach the same results,
treating most instances of sex-specific trait discrimination as
impermissible sex discrimination. It is simply the case that
most gender norms do normalize female weakness and male
dominance in a way antithetical to sex equality in the
workplace.
However, the fact that the power/access
approach responds to the problem of sex- specific trait
discrimination with a socially contingent standard rather
than with a formal rule is theoretically and practically
significant.
Theoretically, the power/access approach
In Griggs the Supreme Court invalidated the employer's requirements
of a high school diploma and the passing of a standardized general
intelligence test in order to be hired for certain jobs on the grounds that
the requirements disproportionately excluded African American
workers.
The Court explained that "good intent or absence of
discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability." 401 U.S. at 433.
As I have discussed previously, disparate impact and disparate
treatment analyses of trait discrimination may also be similar in that the
question of whether the trait is one that matters enough to warrant legal
protection is at the core of both frameworks. See supra note __.
227
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reflects the intuition that nondiscrimination between the
sexes requires something other than rigid neutrality. It
conceives of nondiscrimination as being about the substance
of gender norms and the social way in which gender is
constructed and played out, rather than about the existence
of gender differences per se. Practically, the fact that the
power/access approach allows for the possibility of some
sex-specific job requirements means that employers will feel
less pressure to mandate a narrowly homogenous,
androgynous work place.
Conclusion:
This paper began by emphasizing the differences
between ontological and trait based discrimination. The two
are distinct in important ways. Ontological discrimination
in which all women (or all men) are categorically excluded
or disadvantaged is clearly “because of” sex.
Trait
discrimination, of either a sex-neutral or sex-specific variety,
in which only a subset of women or men are excluded, is less
clearly so.
Yet, as this paper has suggested, ontological
discrimination and sex-specific trait discrimination are
conceptual cousins. While ontological discrimination is
often based on an allegiance to gender roles and a belief that
women (or men) simply do not belong in certain places, sexspecific trait discrimination too often stems from gender
norms or scripts dictating appropriate and inappropriate
behavior for women (or men). Just as Title VII clearly
prohibits employers from acting on social gender roles that
call for the blanket exclusion of all women or men from
particular jobs, so should title VII prohibit employers from
acting on gender norms or scripts which, in perhaps more
complex and subtle ways, make it more difficult for
individuals of one sex or the other to participate effectively
in the work world. The power/access approach demands
just such a focus. It treats as actionable sex discrimination
those forms, and only those forms, of sex-specific trait
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discrimination grounded on gender norms and scripts that a
society concerned about substantive equality must be
invested in changing.
The core contention of this paper has been that some
sex-specific employment requirements should be permitted
and that nondiscrimination does not require rigid sex
neutrality. Given the controversial nature of this claim, it is
worth recognizing and responding to the two distinct ways
in which my argument may be read and understood. One
could view my argument as reflecting a perfectionist belief
in the importance for human flourishing of maintaining
gender roles and differences. The argument would be that I
allow employers to act upon some gender differences
because I think maintaining gender roles is, at least to some
degree, good for individuals. I am not, as a general matter,
opposed to courts interpreting social legislation based on
some underlying perfectionist beliefs. Indeed, I have argued
elsewhere that significant areas of civil rights law cannot be
understood without recognizing a covert perfectionism
driving the decisions.228 As I stated at the outset, however,
my approach in this paper is better understood, not as a
perfectionist argument, but as a pragmatically liberal effort
at statutory interpretation. Title VII seeks to end caste-like
sex hierarchy in the workplace. It should, therefore, prohibit
employers from acting, in either an ontological or trait-based
way, on gender norms that reinforce such hierarchy. Yet not
all gender norms are created equal and not every gender
difference should be equated with gender inequality.
The courts, as it turns out, have generally gotten these
cases right. Courts seem to be applying something of a
“sniff test” to cases of sex-specific trait discrimination. They
treat discrimination against women with small children as
actionable sex discrimination, along with discrimination
See Kimberly A. Yuracko, One for You and One for Me: Is Title IX’s SexBased Proportionality Requirement for College Varsity Athletic Positions
Defensible? 97 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2003); Yuracko, Private Nurses and
Playboy Bunnies, supra note __.

228
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against aggressive women, and that against effeminate men.
Yet, for reasons not fully articulated, they refuse to treat as
actionable discrimination against men in dresses. These
decisions may at first look inconsistent and unprincipled.
When viewed through the lens of the power/access
approach, however, they become coherent. In other words,
the courts seem to be intuiting what the power/access
approach makes explicit—namely that while Title VII
certainly requires a social transformation, the transformation
called for need not result in a homogenized and genderless
workplace.
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